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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
Jayni Searle,
Appellant,
Case No. 20000274-CA
v.

,

Boyd and Dorothy Searle,

]

Appellee.

)
Priority 4

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a final order of the Third District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, which set aside
entry of a foreign judgment entered by the Fort Peck Sioux and
Assiniboine Tribal Court on October 16, 1998, and denied
enforcement of foreign judgment.

The Utah Court of Appeals has

jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE ANNO. § 78-2a3(2)(j) and Rule 3 of the UTAH R. APP. P.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW
The issues presented for review in this case are:
I.

Did the trial court err when it concluded that the October

16, 1999 Tribal Court Order was unenforceable because it "relates
to and stems from" the May 22, 1998 Order?

1

This issue presents a

question of law that does not require deference to the trial
court.

Marquiles By and Through Marquiles v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d

1195, 1199-1200 (Utah 1985).

The final order was decided after

Motions and Memoranda were filed and upon the record.

This issue

was sufficiently pled and preserved in said Motions and Memoranda
at R. at 2-18, 19-74, 208-321, & 326-424.
II.

Did the trial court err in setting aside the Entry of the

Foreign Judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure?

This issue presents a question of law that does not

require deference to the trial court.

Marquiles By and Through

Marauiles v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195, 1199-1200 (Utah 1985). This
issue was sufficiently pled and preserved in said Motions and
Memoranda at R. at 208-321 & 326-424
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Appellant believes the following statutes and constitutional
provisions are determinative of this appeal.
Statutory Provisions
UTAH CODE ANN.

§78-22a-l et. seg. (1999)
Rules of Procedure

Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 60 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE/FACTS
Overview:
An action was commenced on June 15, 1999 in the Utah Third
District Court in and for Salt Lake County to enforce two foreign
judgments, to wit: (1) A Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Decree (herein "Custody Decree") entered on October 16, 1998; and
(2) An Order on an Order to Show Cause Hearing (herein "Contempt
Order") entered on November 23, 1998.

Both orders stem from a

proceeding in the Fort Peck Assiniboine and Sioux Tribal Court
(herein after "Tribal Court").

The Honorable Judge Leslie A.

Lewis presided over the Third District Court matter from which
this appeal arises.
The Custody Decree was entered on a default judgment against
Appellees due to their failure to answer a Petition for Sole
Custody filed by Appellant.

The Petition for Sole Custody was

filed in the Tribal Court on or about the 8th day of September,
1998.

The Contempt Order was entered after an Order to Show

Cause Hearing in which: (1) Appellees failed to appear at the
hearing after having been served both personally and through
their counsel with notice of the hearing; and (2) Evidence was
offered by Appellant to support the contempt determination by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The District Court entered an

Entry of Judgment on August 25, 1999 to assist Appellant in the
enforcement of the judgments.

The Request for Entry of Judgment
3

was filed subsequent to the expiration of the thirty day time
period required under UTAH CODE ANNO. §78-22a-3 (1999).

The trial

court set aside the August 25, 1999 Entry of Judgment and denied
enforcement of the foreign judgment.
Background:
1.

In February of 1998, Appellees commenced an action in

the State of Utah, Third District Juvenile Court, seeking to
terminate the parental rights of Appellant.
an Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Custody.

Appellees also filed

On March 3, 1998, the

Third District Juvenile Court, Judge Olof A. Johansson presiding,
granted the Ex Parte Motion and entered an Ex Parte Order of
Temporary Custody.

In mid-March of 1998, Appellant filed a

Petition to Transfer Jurisdiction over the matter to the Fort
Peck Tribal Court and a Petition to Invalidate the Ex Parte Order
of Temporary Custody.
2.

See R. at 2-14, 48-51.

On May 15, 1998, the Third District Juvenile Court,

Judge Olof A. Johansson presiding, issued an order transferring
jurisdiction over the matter to the Fort Peck Tribal Court.

On

May 22, 1998, the Fort Peck Tribal Court accepted Jurisdiction
and ordered that the minor child who was the subject of the
termination action be taken to the reservation and temporary
custody placed with Appellant.

Appellant filed a Petition for

Writ of Assistance action in the Third District Court in Utah for
enforcement of the May 22, 1998 order.

4

On June 8, 1998, after a

hearing involving both court's judges and all counsel involved,
the Third District Juvenile Court and the Fort Peck Tribal Court
issued orders staying the proceedings pending review by a higher
court.

See R. at 2-14, 48-51.

In mid to late June of 1998,

Appellant filed a Petition for Extraordinary Relief with the Utah
Court of Appeals.
On September 1, 1998, this Court issued an order stating:
The juvenile court transferred jurisdiction
over issues concerning the minor, C.S., to
the Fort Peck Tribal Court and the tribal
court accepted jurisdiction over the matter,
including jurisdiction over custody issues.
Since the juvenile court no longer had
jurisdiction over the matter after the tribal
court accepted jurisdiction, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that the petition for extra ordinary
relief is hereby granted, the matter is
deemed transferred to the tribal court, and
any orders issued by the juvenile court after
May 22, 1998, are hereby vacated. See R. at
2-14, 48-51.
3.

On September 8, 1998, Appellant filed a petition for

custody in the Tribal Court and Appellant caused Appellees to be
served by depositing a copy of the petition in the U.S. Mail and
sending it to Appellees' counsel.

On September 9, 1998, pursuant

to a voluntary dismissal by Appellees and a stipulation thereto
by Appellant, the Fort Peck Tribal Court entered an order
dismissing the termination of parental rights action.

The order

continued the May 22, 1998 order transferring temporary custody
to Appellant.

See R. at 2-14, 48-51.

5

4.

On October 16, 1998, the tribal court entered a default

judgment against Appellee on petition for custody and Appellant
caused Appellees to be served by depositing a copy of the
petition in the U.S. Mail and sending it to Appellees' counsel.
On November 2, 1998, a Motion for Order to Show Cause with
supporting affidavit was filed with the Fort Peck Tribal Court.
The Court issued an Order on November 2, 1998 directing that a
hearing be held and that Appellees appear at the hearing on
November 19, 1998.

The Motion and Order were served upon

Appellees and upon their counsel by U.S. Mail

A hearing was held

on November 19, 1998 and Appellees failed to appear at the
hearing.

An order was issued on the November 23, 1998 hearing

and was served upon Appellees and their Counsel by U.S. Mail on
November 24, 1998.
5.

See R. at 2-14, 48-51.

No appeals have been taken of any of the orders issued

by the Fort Peck Tribal Court.

On March 8, 1998, Judge Hanson

refused to give full faith and credit and enforce the May 22,
1998 tribal court order because at the time of the transfer of
custody, Appellees were not given a hearing in which they could
oppose the transfer of custody, thereby, in Judge Hanson's view,
denying Appellees due process and dismissed the matter.
at 2-14, 48-51.

See R.

Judge Hanson's ruling specifically provided that

his ruling did not affect a foreign judgment action on subsequent
tribal court rulings.

See R. at 2-14, 48-51, 177.
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6.

This matter was commenced on June 15, 1999 under the

Utah Foreign Judgment Act.

See R. at 2-14.

On July 15, 1999, 30

days had passed without the filing of a Motion to Stay as
Required by the Utah Foreign Judgment Act.

See R. at 66-67.

An Application for Entry of Judgment was filed on August 13,
1999.

See R. at 66-67.

An Entry of Judgment was entered on

August 25, 1999 recognizing the October 16, 1998 Custody Decree.
See R. at 68-74.
7.

On November 16, 1999, Appellee filed a Motion to Set

Aside the August 25, 1999 Entry of Judgment.1

See R. at 153-207.

A temporary stay was issued on November 23, 1999.

See R. at 324.

A Response to the Motion to Set Aside was filed by Appellant on
December 1, 1999.

See R. at 326-424.

on February 7, 2000.

The Court issued a ruling

See R. at 611-615.

on the Court's ruling on February 25, 2000.

An order was issued
See R. at 620-624.

This appeal followed.
The Third District Court's Findings:
The trial court made the following Findings of Fact:
1.
Petitioner Jayni Searle (hereafter
"Petitioner") filed a petition for Writ of Assistance
in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, Case No. 98-090-5344, In the Matter of
Chad Searle, a Minor Indian Child, seeking to enforce a
May 22, 1998, Fort Peck Tribal Court custody Order that

1

The Motion also sought to address other issues which
are not pertinent to this appeal.
7

transferred custody from Respondent Boyd Searle
(hereafter "Respondent") to the Petitioner. The
petition sought recognition of the May 22nd Order as a
foreign judgment under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act.
2.
Judge Timothy R. Hanson denied the petition
on the basis that since Respondent was not given an
opportunity to be heard at the May 22nd hearing, the
Order was not entitled to full faith and credit.
3.
Petitioner subsequently filed a Petition
before this Court to enforce an October 16, 1998 Fort
Peck Tribal Court Order's Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Decree, finding that Respondents had
"wrongfully maintained custody in contravention...of
[the] Court's order of May 22, 1998."
4.
On August 25, 1999, this Court entered an
Order entitled "Entry of Judgment" which purported to
give full faith and credit to the October 16th Tribal
Court Decree... SEE R. AT 620-21.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Enforcement of the Tribal Court Order: The trial court erred
when it concluded that the Custody Order was unenforceable.

The

trial court based its ruling on its conclusion that the October
16, 1998 Custody Order "relates to and stems from" the Temporary
Order of May 22, 1998.

This legal conclusion does not reflect

the Utah Court's long standing view of enforcement of foreign
judgment actions.

The Court's conclusion does not address

factual determination regarding finality and validity as required
by the Estate of Jones standard.

The conclusion does not reflect

any viable standard under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act.
Accordingly, it is an erroneous ruling and should be vacated
because the judgment satisfies both the finality and validity
standards.

8

Rule 60(b) Motion : The trial court erred in granting
Appellees' Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside the August 25, 1998
Entry of the Foreign Judgment.

Under Rule 60(b) of the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure the Motion must be brought within 90
days of the entry of the judgment.

The judgment in the instant

matter became properly entered on July 15, 1999.

The Rule 60(b)

Motion was not filed until November 15, 1999, which is beyond the
ninety day time period or a reasonable time period.
Additionally, Appellees failed to demonstrate any of the
enumerated grounds for which relief could have been granted under
Rule 60(b).
ARGUMENT
A.

TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE ORDER WAS
NOT ENFORCEABLE BECAUSE IT "RELATED TO OR STEMMED" FROM
THE MAY 22, 1998 TEMPORARY ORDER

i.

THE TRIAL

COURT'S

RULING AND UNDERLYING

JUDGMENTS

On or about February 7, 2000, the trial court issued a
memorandum decision entitled "Court's Ruling," which stated as
follows:
...Having reviewed the moving and responding memoranda
with respect to remaining motions, the Court rules as
state herein. Since the Motions before the Court are
related to concerns previously brought before Judge
Hanson, this Court provides a brief procedural history
of that case and its connection to the present case.
In Chad Searle, the petitioner herein filed a Writ of
Assistance seeking to enforce a May 22, 1998, Fort Peck
Tribal Court custody Order that transferred custody

9

from respondent Boyd Searle to petitioner. The
Petition essentially sought recognition of the May 22nd
Order as a foreign judgment under the Utah Foreign
Judgment Act. Judge Hanson denied the Petition on the
basis that since respondent Boyd Searle was not given
an opportunity to be heard at the May 22nd hearing, the
Order was not entitled to full faith and credit. (See
Order of Dismissal, dated July 26, 1999).
In this case, the petitioner is attempting to
enforce the Tribal Court's October 16, 1998, Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree, finding that
the respondents had wrongfully maintained custody in
contravention...of [the] Court's order of May 22, 1998."
On August 25, 1999, this Court entered an order
entitled "Entry of Judgment" which purported to give
full faith and credit to the October 16th Decree. The
respondents are now seeking to set aside the August
25th Order and the October 16th Tribal Court Decree.
The Court rules that the October 16th Tribal Court
Decree directly relates to and stems from an Order
which another court has concluded to not be entitled to
full faith and credit. Specifically, the Decree
reinforces the May 22nd Order and reiterates that it
"is hereby continued." The October 16th Decree is
therefore flawed because it maintains custody of the
minor child under an Order which was issued without
giving respondent Boyd Searle his due process right to
be heard. Accordingly, the October 16th Order is
similarly not entitled to full faith and credit. The
Motion to Set Aside is therefore [granted] in part and
this Court's August 25th Judgment is set aside... SEE R.
at 617-18. See Addenda "A."
A subsequent Written Order was prepared and submitted by
Appellee and signed by the trial judge on February 27, 2000,
which identified the following Factual Findings from the "Court's
Ruling:"
1.
Petitioner Jayni Searle (hereafter "Petitioner")
filed a petition for Writ of Assistance in the Third
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
Case No. 98-090-5344, In the Matter of Chad Searle, a Minor
Indian Child, seeking to enforce a May 22, 1998, Fort Peck
Tribal Court custody Order that transferred custody from
10

Respondent Boyd Searle ... to the Petitioner. The petition
sought recognition of the May 22nd Order as a foreign
judgment under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act.
2.
Judge Timothy R. Hanson denied the petition on the
basis that since Respondent was not given an opportunity to
be heard at the May 22nd hearing, the Order was not entitled
to full faith and credit.
3.
Petitioner subsequently filed a Petition before
this Court to enforce an October 16, 1998 Fort Peck Tribal
Court Order's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Decree, finding that Respondents had "wrongfully maintained
custody in contravention...of [the] Court's order of May 22,
1998."
4.
On August 25, 1999, this Court entered an Order
entitled "Entry of Judgment" which purported to give full
faith and credit to the October 16th Tribal Court Decree...
SEE R. AT 620-21. See Addenda "B"

The trial court entered Conclusions of Law which, based upon
these findings, state:
The October 16th Trial Court Decree directly relates to
and stems from an Order which another court in Chad
Searle has concluded not to be entitled to full faith
and credit. Specifically, the Decree reinforces the
May 22nd Order and reiterates that it "is hereby
continued." The October 16th Decree is therefore
flawed because it maintains custody of the minor child
under an Order which was issued without giving
Respondent Boyd Searle his due process right to be
heard. Accordingly, the October 16th Order is
similarly not entitled to full faith and credit, and
the August 25th Order must be set aside. See R. at
631. See Addenda "C."

The foreign judgments, Judge Hanson's Letter of July 15,
1999, and the Order of July 26, 1999 provide the evidence upon
which the trial court could have made any finding and/or
conclusion under Utah Foreign Judgment analysis or a full faith
and credit analysis.

11

A.

The Custody Decree from October 16, 1998 provides

ows:
The above-entitled matter came before the Court on
Jayni Searle's Petition for Restoration of Custody. An
entry of, notice of, and application for default having
been entered for Respondent's failure to answer the
Petition in a timely manner. An Affidavit of Residence
and Grounds having been filed by Jayni Searle. The
Court having reviewed the file and having made its
decision, now enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT:
1.

2.

3.
4.
5.
6.

7.
8.

9.
10.
11.

Chad Searle is subject to the jurisdiction of
this Court pursuant to a ruling by Judge
Stafne that this Court has exclude
jurisdiction.
Chad Searle is a Native American child and a
member or eligible for membership in the Fort
Peck Assmiboine and Sioux Tribes.
Jayne Searle is a biological mother of Chad
Searle.
Temporary custody of Chad was awarded by the
Court to Jayne Searle on May 22, 1998.
The emotional father of Chad Searle died in
February of 1998.
Since then, Boyd and Dorothy Searle have
wrongfully maintained custody in
contravention of the Indian Child Welfare Act
(25 U.S.C. 1901 et. seq.) And this Court's
order of May 22, 1998.
Boyd and Dorothy Searle are the emotional
grandparents and currently have physical
custody despite the Court's order.
Boyd and Dorothy Searle have petitioned
the court to dismiss the termination
action pending in tribal court. See
Attached exhibit #1.
Jayne Searle is a person fit to assume
custody on the afore-mentioned child.
Jayne Searle and Chad Searle enjoy the
relationship of mother and child.
Jayne Searle and Chad Searle have a
normal parent-child bond which has been
drastically impacted by the emotional
grandparents.

12

BASED UPON the foregoing Findings of Fact, the
Court hereby enters its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
The matter is properly before the Court
pursuant to tribal code.
2.
Jayne and Chad Searle are members or eligible
for membership in the Fort Peck Assiniboine
and Sioux Tribes.
3.
Jayne Searle is domiciled on the reservation.
4.
Chad Searle, pursuant to law and tribal
custom, became domiciled on the reservation
due to the death of his physical custodian
and emotional father, Boyd Carl Searle.
5.
Jayne Searle is a fit and appropriate person
who should be awarded custody.
BASED UPON the foregoing Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, the Court hereby enters the
following:
DECREE AND ORDER
1.
Chad Searle is hereby placed in the permanent
custody, care, and control of Jayne Searle,
his natural and biological mother.
2.
The previous order requiring transfer of Chad
Searle to the reservation is hereby
continued.
3.
Law enforcement is hereby directed to remove
the child and return him to the reservation.
SEE R. at 2-4 & Addenda "D."

B.

The Contempt Order from November 23, 1998 which

provides as follows:
The above-entitled matter came before the Court
for hearing on an Order to Show Cause on the 19*r Day
of November, 1998. Present for the hearing was Jayni
Searle. The Court notes that Boyd and Dorothy Searle
were personally served with notice of the hearing and
the Order to Show Cause by certified, return receipt,
U.S. mail. The Court notes further that counsel for
Boyd and Dorothy Searle, Maria Christina Santana, was
served by certified, return receipt, U.S. mail. The
Court, having heard testimony from Jayni Searle and
argument and having fully reviewed the file, enters the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT

13

1.
Chad Searle is an Indian child as defined in the
Indian Child Welfare Act.
2.
Jayni Searle is an Indian parent as defined in the
Indian Child Welfare Act.
3.
Jayni Searle is domiciled on the reservation.
4.
Boyd Carl Searle was Chad Searle's emotional
father, having been deemed so by his own admission
in a divorce action in the Third District Court.
5.
On February 1998, Boyd Carl Searle died.
6.
Chad Searle was in the custody of his emotional
father, Boyd Carl Searle, when the emotional
father died.
7.
The emotional grandparents, Boyd and Dorothy
Searle filed a Petition to Terminate Parental
Rights of Jayni Searle in the Third District Court
in Salt Lake County for the State of Utah.
8.
On March 3, 1998, Boyd and Dorothy Searle obtained
temporary custody of Chad through order of the
Third District Juvenile Court of Utah.
9.
Boyd and Dorothy Searle also filed a Petition for
Protective Order.
10. Subsequent to that order, Jayni Searle retained
private counsel, Mr. Jim C. Shirley of Salt Lake
City, Utah.
11. Mr. Shirley obtained a copy of the March 3, 1998
order. He subsequently received copies of the
other documents. This transpired after the order
of temporary custody was entered by the [juvenile
court. Boyd and Dorothy Searle did not serve
Jayni Searle or the Fort Peck Tribes with Notice
prior to obtaining the temporary custody order in
juvenile court or the protective order in district
court.
12. The Petition for Protective Order was certified
from Utah's Third District Court to Utah's Third
District Juvenile Court.
13. Mr. Shirley sent courtesy copies of the pleadings
to Mr. Gary Beaudry, counsel for the Fort Peck
Tribes. Prior to receipt of these courtesy
copies, the tribe had not been notified of the
proceedings as required by I.C.W.A.
14. Ms. Searle filed a Petition to transfer the
proceedings to tribal court under 25 U.S.C.
1911(b) in the juvenile court, alleging concurrent
jurisdiction.
15. Ms. Searle subsequently filed an Amended Petition
to transfer under 25 U.S.C. 1911(a) in the
juvenile court, alleging exclusive jurisdiction.
14

Ms. Searle filed a Petition to invalidate the
improperly entered custody order, citing to 25
U.S.C. 1914 and alleging violations of 1912(a, d,
& e) .
Boyd and Dorothy Searle filed a Response to the
Amended Petition to Transfer, alleging that
domicile had not changed at the death of the
emotional father and that Jayni Searle abandoned
the child, Chad Searle.
Ms. Searle filed a Reply which cited to case law
which demonstrated that under common law domicile
did change at the death of a custodian to the
surviving natural parent and which alleged grounds
to demonstrate that Ms. Searle had not abandoned
the child.
On May 15, 1998, the Third District Juvenile
Court, in and for the state of Utah issued an
order transferring jurisdiction to the tribal
court.
On May 22, 1998, this Court found that it has
exclusive jurisdiction and accepted jurisdiction.
Additionally, the Court invalidated the previous
order granting custody to Boyd and Dorothy Searle
and ordered that the child be brought back to the
reservation and placed in the temporary custody of
the natural mother.
On the 3rd Day of June, 1998, the Third District
Juvenile Court entered an order staying its May
15, 1998 order.
On June 8, 1998, the tribal and juvenile courts
issued stays of the proceedings pending hearing
before an appeals or federal court on the issue of
whether the juvenile court had any jurisdiction to
enter such an order.
Ms. Searle caused to be filed an appeal in the
Court of Appeals in and for Utah.
On August 31, 1998, counsel for Boyd and Dorothy
Searle signed a voluntary dismissal of the
Petition to Terminate.
On the 1st Day of September, 1998, the Court of
Appeals found that the Juvenile Court did not have
jurisdiction to enter any orders.
On the 8th Day of September, 1998, Jayni Searle
filed a Petition for Sole Custody.
Counsel for Boyd and Dorothy Searle, Maria
Santana, was served with this Petition for Sole
Custody.
On the 9th Day of September, 1998, Jayni Searle
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filed a Stipulation to Dismiss Action Brought by
Boyd and Dorothy Searle.
29. On the 9th Day of September, 1998, the Court
granted Boyd and Dorothy Searle's voluntary
dismissal but specifically ordered that "the
previous order of temporary custody entered by
this Court on May 22, 1998, is hereby continued
with Jayni Searle."
30. Counsel for Boyd and Dorothy Searle were served
with the stipulation and the order.
31. Jayni Searle subsequently filed a Notice of Entry
of Default, Entry of Default, and Application for
Entry of Default. All these documents were served
on counsel for Boyd and Dorothy Searle, Maria
Christina Santana, by U.S. Mail.
32. The Court entered a default and entered Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree. The
decree was served on counsel for Boyd and Dorothy
Searle, Maria Christina Santana, by U.S. Mail.
33. Jayni Searle subsequently filed a Corrected Notice
of Entry of Default, Corrected Entry of Default,
and Corrected Application for Entry of Default.
All these documents were served on counsel for
Boyd and Dorothy Searle, Maria Christina Santana,
by U.S. Mail.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the
Court hereby enters its:
Conclusions of Law
1.
Chad Searle is an Indian Child as defined by the
Indian Child Welfare Act.
2.
The Court previously entered a finding and
conclusion of exclusive jurisdiction under 25
U.S.C. 1911(a) based upon the fact that upon the
death of the custodian/emotional father, domicile
of Chad Searle became that of his mother pursuant
to tribal custom and well-established common law.
The Court previously rejected Boyd and Dorothy
Searle's contentions as meritless.
3.
The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the
issues of custody and contempt before it. The
Indian Child Welfare Act applies to the case at
hand. Tribal court, is the proper forum for any
litigation involving the custody of an Indian
child which is not the result of a divorce action
or delinquency matter. The Court obtained
jurisdiction originally due to the transfer of the
litigation involving the Petition to Terminate
Parental Rights. At the time the Petition to
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Terminate Parental Rights was withdrawn, the Court
retained jurisdiction due to a pending Petition
for Sole Custody filed by Jayni Searle which was
filed prior to the stipulation allowing dismissal.
The Court continues to enjoy exclusive
jurisdiction. The Court has original jurisdiction
over the custody matter involving Chad Searle due
to the filing of the Petition for Sole Custody.
Jurisdiction has never been terminated by the
Court as contended by the emotional grandparents,
Boyd and Dorothy Searle.
The Court has personal jurisdiction over Jayni
Searle and Chad Searle as domiciliaries of the
reservation pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare
Act.
The court has personal jurisdiction over Boyd and
Dorothy Searle that was acquired when litigation
involving the termination of parental right action
was transferred to Tribal Court. See 92 Corpus
Juris Secundum, Venue § 207 (the court receiving
the transfer of jurisdiction/venue "thereby
acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter, all
the parties thereto, and all matters incident
thereto, and it may inquire into matters connected
with the subject matter of the action").
Additionally, the Court has jurisdiction due to
emotional grandparents' voluntary filing of
pleadings before the Court. The Rules of Tribal
Procedure require that the party file a special
and limited appearance if they do not to wish to
subject themselves to the jurisdiction of the
tribal court. Boyd and Dorothy Searle failed to
file any special and limited appearance as
required.
Jayni Searle having satisfied her burden by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that:
a.
Boyd and Dorothy Searle were served with a true
and correct copy of the Order to Show Cause;
b.
Boyd and Dorothy Searle voluntarily and willfully
failed to comply with the Court's order to appear
and produce the child;
c.
Boyd and Dorothy Searle voluntarily and willfully
failed to comply with the Court's May 22, 1998
order to surrender physical custody of the child;
and
d.
that Boyd and Dorothy Searle had the capacity to
comply with the Court's orders.
BASED upon the foregoing Conclusions of Law, the
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Court hereby enters the following:
ORDER

1.
2.
3.
4.

5.
6.
7.

8.
9.
10.

Boyd and Dorothy Searle are hereby held in
contempt of Court;
The Court will stay the jail time if and when Boyd
and Dorothy Searle agree to bring Chad to the
reservation as previously ordered;
A bench warrant is issued for the immediate
detention and transport of Boyd and Dorothy Searle
to jail;
The Court will lift the Bench Warrant if and when
Boyd and Dorothy Searle contact the court, agree
to return the child to the reservation, and make
suitable arrangements for the transport of Chad
Searle to the reservation;
A bench warrant is issued for the immediate
detention and transport of Chad Searle to the
reservation;
The Court will lift the Bench Warrant upon Chad
Searle's return to the custody of his mother;
Boyd and Dorothy Searle be required to reimburse
the tribe for costs incurred in the Fort Peck
Tribe's effort to secure the release and return of
Chad Searle to the reservation;
The Fort Peck Tribes are ordered to provide the
Court with a specific amount;
Boyd and Dorothy Searle are ordered to pay Jayni
Searle for reasonable attorneys fees incurred; and
Jayni Searle is instructed to secure a list of
attorneys fees incurred. See R. at 5-12 &
Addenda "E.
99

C.

Judge Hanson's July 26, 1999 Order of Dismissal

provides the following:
The above-entitled action is dismissed without
prejudice as to any Order entered subsequent to the May
22, 1998 Order which has been entered by the Fort Peck
Tribal court and the dismissal of this action in no way
precludes subsequent enforcement of subsequent Orders
through a filing under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act,
and which are otherwise enforceable under law. See R.
at & Addenda "F."
D.

Judge Hanson's July 15, 1999 Letter provides the
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following language:
With regard to the complaints of Ms. Santana that Mr.
Shirley has brought this matter before Judge Lewis,
please be advised that I do not find any impropriety in
that regard, as it was my intention to only address the
May 22, 1198 Order and the Writ of Assistance that was
requested based thereon.
If any subsequent Order has been properly
domesticated under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act and is
otherwise enforceable, I am confident that Judge Lewis,
who apparently is assigned to the case, will handle the
matter in accordance with the facts as she finds them
and in accordance with the law. See 378-379, & Addenda

ii.

ANALYSIS

OF THE ERROR IN

THE CONCLUSION

OF LAW

(1)

Court Incorrectly Entered a Conclusion Based Upon the
Evidence

The primary evidence before the Courts were the foreign
judgments, Judge Hanson's July 15, 1999 letter, and the Judge
Hanson's ruling on the May 22, 1998 Order.

The Court incorrectly

concluded that the October 16, 1998 Custody Decree was
unenforceable because it "related to and stemmed from" the May
22, 1998 Temporary Order of Custody which Judge Hanson refused to
enforce.2

As the Findings of Fact indicate, the Tribal Court did

in fact: (1) Find that "temporary custody ... was awarded ... on May
22, 1998," and that Appellees had "wrongfully maintained custody

2

It should be noted that the July 26, 1999 Order of Dismissal issued by Judge
Hanson is on appeal before this Court. For purposes of this appeal, it will be assumed that Judge
Hanson's ruling was correct. However, should this Court conclude otherwise, the underlying
ruling would accordingly fail as a matter of fact and law.
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in contravention... [the Tribal] Court's order of May 22, 1998;"
and (2) Order that "the previous order3 requiring transfer of
Chad Searle to the reservation is hereby continued."

However,

the trial court's conclusion, based upon these findings and
order, that the Custody Decree stemmed from the May 22, 1998
Order is not supported by the facts in the record.
The evidence presented below indicates that the trial
court's conclusion fails to factor in the entire gambit of
language in the Findings, Conclusions, and Order from October 16,
1998. The October 16, 1998 Custody Decree clearly states that the
"matter came before the Court on Jayni Searle's Petition for
Restoration of Custody."

Emphasis added.

Furthermore, the

Custody Decree clearly states that "an entry of, notice of, and
application for default [were! entered for Respondent's failure
to answer the Petition in a timely manner."

Emphasis added.

The

Tribal Court found that Appellant "is a person fit to assume
custody,'' Appellant and the child "enjoy the relationship of
mother and child," and other findings pertaining to a permanent
order of custody.

The Court went on to conclude that "Jayni

3

It is not clear from the tribal court ruling whether it
was referring to the May 22, 1998 Order at this point or the
September 9, 1998 Order which continued its previous orders. The
September 9, 1998 Order was in response to Appellees' Motion to
Dismiss their termination of parental rights action in tribal
court. It ordered that Respondent's return the child also, but
came after Appellees had an opportunity to appeal the May 22,
1998 Order.
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Searle is a fit and appropriate person who should be awarded
custody."

The Court also ordered that "Chad Searle is hereby

placed in the permanent custody, care, and control of Jayni
Searle, his natural and biological mother."
While the Court did continue its previous order from May 22,
1998, this was done in connection with the grant of permanent
custody.

The Tribal Court clearly indicates October 16, 1998

Custody Decree resulted from a default judgment on Appellant's
Tribal Court Petition for Custody.

The Custody Decree only

related to the May 22, 1998 Order because the May 22, 1998 Order
was a temporary order in the same action.

Under the Doctrine of

Merger, the temporary order of custody would merge into the
permanent order of custody.

See Ikon Office Solutions, Inc. v.

Crook, 6 P.3d 1143 (Utah App. 2000) (under Doctrine of Merger,
TRO merges into preliminary injunction).

The final order is the

order reviewed for any defects because the temporary order is
merged into the final order.

See Birch Creek Irrigation v.

Prothero, 858 P.2d 990 (Utah 1993) (Court noted "had the trial
court reached a final Judgment granting or denying a permanent
injunction, we would dismiss that portion of the appeal
challenging the temporary restraining order under the doctrine of
merger.")4

In the instant matter the final order was valid and

4

Under the case law of certain jurisdictions, Appellant
would have lost her ability to continue to fight the May 22, 1998
Order under the Doctrine of Merger because it would have been
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final as demonstrate infra

and should not be denied enforcement

because Judge Hanson found deficiencies in a temporary order.
The trial judge determined that the defect in a temporary
order rendered invalid a subsequent final order because it
continued the previously entered order.
incorrect.

This conclusion was

A subsequent order is valid regardless of whether the

prior order was erroneous.

Crowther v. District Court of Salt

Lake County, 54 P.2d 243, 246 (Utah 1936) .

The following

argument in this respect was provided to the trial court and is
incorporated here by reference:
Utah Courts have held that a contempt order is valid, even
if the underlying order is erroneously entered. Crowther v.
District Court of Salt Lake County, 54 P.2d 243, 246 (Utah
1936) ("disobedience of an order made by a court within its
jurisdiction and power is contempt, although the order may
be clearly erroneous"). Other jurisdictions have also
addressed this issue and have held:
Consequently, the authorities are in accord that
where the court has jurisdiction of the parties
and of the subject matter of the suit and the
legal authority to make the order5, a party
refusing to obey it, however erroneously made, is
liable for contempt. Such order, though
erroneous, is lawful within the meaning of
contempt statutes until it is reversed by an
appellate court...the fact that a witness may
disagree with the Court on the propriety of its
ruling is, of course, no excuse for his not
complying with it. The proper method of
challenging the correctness of an adverse ruling
is by an appeal and not by disobedience. Deskins
lost if it was not specifically mentioned in the final order.
See Brooks v. Brooks 689 N.E.2d 987 (Ohio App. 1996).
5

This standard is consistent with the Estate of Jones
Standard for enforcement of a foreign judgment.
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v. Waldt, 499 P.2d 206 (Wash. 1972) (emphasis
added); citing to Dike v. Dike, 448 P.2d 490
(Wash. 1968) and Robertson v. Commonwealth, 181
Va. 520,
25 S.E.2d 352 (1943). SEE R. AT 54-55.
A person can clearly be held in contempt for
noncompliance to an order which may be later determined to
have been erroneous.

The underlying principle should be the

same with other subsequent orders which are properly entered
in accordance with due process.
As discussed infra,

the Tribal Court had jurisdiction

over parties and the subject matter.

Accordingly, unless

there is a showing under the standard pronounced in Estate
of Jones 858 P.2d 983, 985 (Utah 1993) that the order is
lacks validity and/or finality unenforceable, the order
should be enforced.

There were no findings under the

Estate of Jones standard or any facts/conclusions which
remotely relate to the standard.

Therefore, the trial

court erred in its conclusion.6
Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rules
4-6 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure clearly indicate the
policy behind the bright line distinction between final and
temporary/interlocutory orders. The clear basis for this
distinction is that interlocutory orders may be modified by the
trial court during the course of the litigation. In custody
matters (as the tribal court matter was), the distinction is even
more evident because the party who is awarded temporary custody
might not be awarded sole custody in the final order.
It would
stand to reason that even if an error or defect in a Utah
District Court temporary custody order existed, the error would
be of no consequence and cured if the final order did not result
from the same defect. This is the very standard under the Utah
Foreign Judgment Act.
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Additionally, the Court's conclusion is not supported
by the evidence.

Several facts exist and are undisputed

which bolster the fact that the final order was valid and
did not suffer from the same infirmities identified by Judge
Hanson in his ruling on the enforceability of the Tribal
Court's May 22, 1998 Order.

These factors include, but are

not limited to, the following: (1) The temporary order was
in place for more than four months (just shy of five months)
prior to the final Custody Decree being issued (May 22, 1998
to October 16, 1998) See R. at 2-14, 48-51; (2) A stay had
been issued on June 8, 1998 by the Tribal Court allowing
Appellees to appeal its May 22, 1998 Order See R. at 2-14,
48-51; (3) Appellees through their counsel were served with
a Petition for Sole Custody on September 8, 1998 See R. at
2-14, 48-51; (4) Appellees failed to respond to Appellant's
Petition and a default was obtained (leading to the October
16, 1998 Custody Decree) See R. at 2-14, 48-51; (5) The
October 16, 1998 Custody Decree gave Appellant permanent
sole legal and physical custody of her child See R. at 2-14,
48-51; and (6) The May 22, 1998 Order had previously been
continued on September 9, 1998 with no object from Appellees
See R. at 2-14, 48-51.
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Appellant was entitled to sole custody based upon the
issuance of a permanent custody order on October 16, 1998.
Appellant had the sole right to determine where the child
lived.

The Court's order only reinforced her right to

determine that the child reside with her on the reservation.
Unlike the temporary order where the Tribal Court still had
a say in the placement decisions.

That decision was and is

now solely in the hands of Appellant.
Based upon the foregoing, the October 16, 1998 Custody
Decree is not invalid merely because it merged a temporary
order that required the child be returned to the
reservation.
default.
Order.

Appellant prevailed based upon Appellees'

Notice was the alleged defect in the May 22, 1998
Such a defect did not exist in the October 16, 1998

Custody Decree.

Accordingly, the trial court's conclusion

is erroneous.
(2)

The Trial Court did not Address The Foreign
Judgment Standard For Enforcement

The trial court did not address the core issues in
determining the validity and finality of the October 16,
1998 Custody Order in making its determination that the
Custody Order was not enforceable.

In addressing this issue

to the trial court, Appellant set forth the law in this
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d.

Appellant adopts by reference that argument and

it forth word for word as follows:
1.

General Principles
To determine if the order is enforceable, the
Court should look to see if the tribal court order
was valid and final. See Estate of Jones, Matter of,
858 P.2d 983, 985 (Utah 1993) (If the judgment meets
the validity and finality criteria, "it is entitled
to full faith and credit"' and is enforceable under
the Utah Foreign Judgment Act). This Court should
enforce the tribal court order of October 16, 1998
because it is both valid and final as set forth
below.
1.
Validity
"In order to be *valid' for purposes of full
faith and credit, a judgment must have been rendered
by a court with competent jurisdiction and in
compliance with the constitutional requirements of
due process." Estate of Jones, Matter of, 858 P.2d
983, 985 (Utah 1993). As more fully argued below,
Respondents have failed to show either element in
that the judgment was rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction after extensive pleadings
being filed and is final for purposes of the analysis
under the foreign judgment act.
A.
Competent Jurisdiction
The original action involving Petitioner's
custodial rights was commenced in the Third District
Juvenile Court of Utah in and for Salt Lake County.
Pursuant to relevant provisions of the Indian Child
Welfare Act, jurisdiction over the juvenile court
matter was transferred to the Fort Peck Tribal Court.
The tribal court obtained exclusive jurisdiction to
any state court. Petitioner filed a petition to
restore sole custody. Subsequently, the tribal court
dismissed the contested action which Respondents had
commenced in [the Third District Juvenile Court]. The
tribal court dismissed the termination action but
retained jurisdiction over the custody issues and
specifically continued the previous order that the
child be returned to the reservation and to
Petitioner's custody. The custody issues were
subsequently decided in favor of Petitioner upon a
default judgment. Under the Indian Child Welfare Act,
the tribal court was the proper forum to resolve the
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C.

temporary and permanent custody issues. See Adoption
of Hallowav, Matter of, 732 P.2d 962, 966 (Utah 1986)
and Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield,
490 U.S. 30, 52, 109 S.Ct. 1507, 1610, 104 L.Ed. 2d
29,
(1989) .
As pointed out by the Halloway decision, the
tribal court is the preferred forum for decisions
involving custody of Native American children. Id.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that
the determination of custody is squarely in the
child's tribal court's hands. Mississippi Band of
Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 52, 109
S.Ct. 1507, 1610, 104 L.Ed. 2d 29,
(1989).
Respondents had a chance to litigate the final custody
issues but failed to file any pleadings in tribal
court, resulting in a default judgment. At no time
has the tribal court dismissed or ceded jurisdiction
over the custody issues. Therefore, the tribal court
was a court of competent jurisdiction.
B.
Due Process
The demands of due process rest on the concept of
basic fairness of procedure and demand a procedure
appropriate to the case and just to the parties
involved. Holm v. Smilowitz 840 P.2d 157, 164 (Utah
App. 1992) (quoting
Wiscombe v. Wiscombe, 744 P.2d
1024, 1025 (Utah App. 1987) (quoting
Rupp v.
Grantsville City, 610 P.2d 338, 341, (Utah 1980)).
"One of the fundamental requisites of due process is
the opportunity to be fully heard" and notice. Id.
Respondents fail to identify any way in which their
due process rights were violated after the May 22,
1998 order. In fact, the tribal court gave them
nearly three months to appeal its [May 22, 1998]
order[] while the stay was issued [on June 8, 1998].
However, Respondents have chosen to sit idle and
ignore the legitimate jurisdiction of the tribal court
with their perceived grievances regarding due process.
Their failure does not equate to a denial of due
process but rather a failure to act judiciously in
protecting one's rights. The tribal court was not
duty bound to wait for Respondents to act.
Respondents were also placed on notice of the
action for custody in tribal court. Despite ample
notice and more than thirty days of opportunity to
respond, Respondents chose not to be involve
themselves in that process. Respondents failed to
respond to Petitioner's Petition for Sole Custody.

27

Respondents' failure resulted in a default judgment on
the custody petition in tribal court. Once again,
Respondents have not filed an appeal or any
appropriate Motion to Set Aside with the Tribal Court.
Respondents failure to participate was of their own
choosing and does not amount to a violation of due
process. Given the foregoing/ there was not a
violation of Respondents' due process rights to be
heard and to have notice. Therefore, Respondents have
had sufficient due process under the circumstances.
Therefore, the order is valid as defined by applicable
case law.
2.
Finality
A.
Estate of Jones Standard of Finality
The finality in the context of domestication of a
foreign order is not the same as determining the
finality of a judgment for purposes of appeal (i.e.
interlocutory v. appeal of right). In the Estate of
Jones decision cited above, the Court held that the
foreign judgment (the California judgment) was "final
because the trial court judgment was not appealed."
Noting that the foreign jurisdiction (California)
provided "a specific time period in which to appeal
from the entry of judgment," the Court found that the
litigant had failed to appear or participate in the
foreign litigation, including a failure to even
"attempt to appeal the judgment." Id. at 98 6.
This Court of Appeals interpretation is entirely
consistent with the other provisions of the Foreign
Judgment Act....These provisions allow for time to file
an appeal or to stay the enforcement if an appeal is
pending. Under this analysis, the judgment is final
in that Respondents failed to participate in the
underlying litigation or challenge the tribal court's
order in any manner (i.e. filing an objection or even
a request for hearing). The time for filing an appeal
has ran and the order is therefore final for purpose
of this analysis.
The applicable provisions of the Fort Peck Tribal
Court Rules of Appellate Procedure differ
significantly from the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure. The orders which are appealable/final are
those which "involves an issue of law consistent with
a violation of due process adversely affecting the
outcome of a trial on the merits, regardless of
whether the final order includes a full determination
on the merits." See Rule 6 of Fort Peck Rules of
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Appellate Procedure (emphasis added). Therefore, the
October 15, 1998 Fort Peck Tribal Court Order granting
custody to Petitioner ...was final under the laws of the
state of rendition as required under the finality
prong.
Having established both prongs, the order
should be given full faith and credit and enforced by
Utah Courts.
D.
Validity and Enforceability — November
23, 1998 Order
Under the analysis set forth above regarding the
Estate of Jones standards, the November 23, 1998 order
regarding the order of custody is enforceable in Utah.
While Respondent's claim that the order is merely an
extension of the previous May 22, 1998 order, this is
inaccurate. Respondents had more than six months to
appeal the May 22, 1998 order or seek to block its
enforcement through the process afforded them by the
tribal court and its appellate division (and even
probably the Federal Court System). Appellants failed
to do so. Additionally, the case law cited to above
clearly stands for the proposition that the order is
valid because a person is under a duty to comply with
an order until it is modified by a court having
appellate jurisdiction over the court of rendition.
The May 22, 1998 order was never modified by the court
of rendition or an appellate court. Therefore, the
contempt order needs to be analyzed under the same due
process analysis set forth above.
First, the order was rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction as set forth above. Second,
Petitioners were served with notice of the order to
show cause, were given an opportunity to appear and
defend, and failed to do so. Petitioners were not
denied due process but [Respondents] simply failed to
act.... SEE R. at 56-61.

E.

The finality and validity analysis was not addressed by the
trial court. The trial court's findings are insufficient to form
a basis upon which to deny enforcement under the relevant case
law.

The trial court did not find that the Tribal Court was not

a court of competent jurisdiction.

The trial court did not make

any findings upon which the trial court could conclude that
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Appellees were denied due process in the Tribal Court's entering
a Default Judgment against Appellees.

The trial court did not

make any findings that the October 16, 1998 Custody Decree was
not final or was the subject of an appeal.

The trial court did

not find that a stay should issue pursuant to the Utah Foreign
Judgment Act (see Utah Code Anno. § 78-22a-4).
The Conclusion of Law that the October 16, 1998 Custody
Decree is not entitled to full faith and credit and enforcement
is erroneous.

Further proceedings are unnecessary to address

this issue based upon the orders themselves which on their face
demonstrate their validity and finality.

Additionally, the

Appellees' failure to file a Motion to Stay within thirty days of
the filing of the Foreign Judgment Action is a factor the Court
should have weighed in Appellant's favor.

This Court should

issue an order directing that the Third District Court forthwith
issue an order directing law enforcement to immediately enforce
the October 16, 1998 Custody Decree.
B.

THE COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED THE RULE 60(B) MOTION
TO SET ASIDE THE AUGUST 25, 1999 ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

i.

Timeliness

The underlying action was a foreign judgment action
commenced pursuant to Utah Code Anno. § 78-22a-l et. seg. (1953
as amended).

The Utah Foreign Judgment Act provides that no

enforcement shall take place within thirty days.
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See Utah Code

Anno- §78-22a-3 (3) (1953 as amended).

In order to stay

enforcement of a foreign judgment, the judgment debtor must file
a Motion for Stay or provide proof that a stay is in effect.
Utah Code Anno. §78-22a-4 (1953 as amended).

See

Utah Code Anno. §

78-22a-5(l) provides that the "foreign judgment filed under this
chapter becomes a lien as provided in Section 78-22a-l if a stay
of execution has not been granted." Utah Code Anno. §78-22-1 (b)
(1953 as amended) provides that the lien becomes effective upon
entry of judgment.
Therefore, pursuant to the statutory framework, the foreign
judgment is entered and given full faith and credit after thirty
days if no Motion to Stay has been filed by the judgment debtor.
Accordingly, the two foreign judgments obtained full faith and
credit on July 15, 1999, thirty days after the filing on June 15,
1999 because Appellees failed to file any Motion to Stay within
the designated time period.

Accordingly, both judgments should

be enforced as if they were Utah Judgments entered on July 15,
1999.
Rule 60(b) provides the following:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a
party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding ...The motion shall
be made within a reasonable time and for reasons
(1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or
taken.
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The Motion to Set Aside was filed by Appellees on or about
November 15, 1999.

See R. at 153. Appellees were appropriately

served with the Foreign Judgment Action on June 15, 1999.
at 17-18.

See R.

The judgment was given full faith and credit on July

15, 1999 due to Appellees failure to file a Motion to Stay in a
timely fashion.

Appellees failed to file a Rule 60(b) Motion

within the 90 days of July 15,1999 (Appellees filed after more
than 120 days).

Appellees had a reasonable time after

discovering that the action had been commenced and a judgment
could be entered as prescribed by the Utah Foreign Judgment Act.
The trial court lacked jurisdiction and erred in granting a
Motion to Set Aside and denying enforcement when the Judgement
was effectively entered by law on July 15, 1999.
ii.

Appellees
failed
to Prove Sufficient
Court Failed to Make Any Conclusion
Rule 60 (b) Ground

Grounds and the
or Finding as to a

The trial court failed to identify which grounds were
applicable to the Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside the August 25,
1999 Entry of Judgment.

See R. at 620-623.

The Judgment should

be reversed in that Appellee's failed to demonstrate evidence
justifying relief.

Appellee's sought relief from the August 25,

1999 Entry of Judgment under Rule 60(b)(3) and (4). See R. at
153-207. Appellee made the following factual assertions in
support of the Motion to Set Aside:
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FACTS RELEVANT TO MOTION TO SET ASIDE
1.
Petitioner commenced an action before Judge
Timothy Hanson seeking to enforce a May 22, 1998 Fort
Peck Tribal Court order that transferred custody of a
minor Chad Searle from Respondents to Petitioner. On
or about March 8, 199[8], Judge Timothy Hanson convened
a hearing and issued an oral ruling denying enforcement
of the May 22, 199[8] trial court order. Judge Hanson
ruled that Respondents were not afforded notice in
violation of due process. See R. at 155.
2.
Respondent's counsel prepared a proposed order and
served it upon counsel for Petitioner. Petitioner
filed an objection to the order. See R. at 155.
3.
While the objection to Judge Hanson's order was
pending, Petitioner filed a new action before this
court requesting the court give "full faith and credit"
to a second Fort Peck Tribal Court order (dated October
16, 1998) which found that temporary custody was
properly transferred by the tribal court on May 22,
1998, that Respondent had wrongfully maintained custody
and that based on these findings the May 22, 1998 order
was in full force and effect and custody was
permanently transferred.
(Exhibit A ) . See R. at 156.
4.
Judge Hanson's oral ruling in the first case had
not been entered as a written order at the time
Respondent filed their response in this action opposing
Petitioner's petition. See R. at 156.
5.
On July 26, 1999, Judge Hanson entered the Order
of Dismissal in the first case stating that the action
is dismissed with prejudice as to the Fort Peck Tribal
Court May 22, 1998 Order. (Exhibit B ) . See R. at 156.
6.
Petitioner did not withdraw her petition seeking
that this court enforce the other tribal court orders
which expressly made findings that Respondent was "in
contempt'' for not obeying the May 22, 1998 order and
that Respondent had wrongfully maintained custody in
contravention of...the May 22, 1998 order." Exhibit A.
See R. at 156.
7.
On August 23, 1999, this Court entered a judgment
giving full faith and credit to the tribal court order
referred to above. (Exhibit C ) . See R. at 156.
On December 1, 1999, Appellant submitted a Response in
Opposition to Appellee's Motion to Set Aside the August 25, 1
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Entry of Judgment.

See R. 347-379.

In Response, Appellant

submitted the following factual statement:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

FACTS
On or about the 15th of May, 1998, the Third District
Juvenile Court transferred jurisdiction over issues
involving Chad Searle to the Fort Peck Tribal Court in
Poplar Montana. See R. at 347.
On or about May 22, 1998, the Fort Peck Tribal Court
accepted jurisdiction and awarded Jayni Searle
temporary custody of Chad Searle, thereby vacating a
previous ex parte order of temporary custody issued by
the Third District Juvenile Court. See R. at 347.
On or about May 27, 1998, Jayni filed a Petition for
Writ of Assistance in the Utah Third District Court
seeking to enforce a May 22, 1998 order entered by the
Fort Peck Tribal Courts. The Petition was assigned to
the Honorable Judge Timothy Hanson. See R. at 347-48.
In February of 1999, Petitioner filed a Motion before
Judge Hanson to give full faith and credit to the
orders before this Court now. See R. at 348.
On or about March 8, 1998, the District Court denied
the Petition for Writ of Assistance finding
specifically that the May 22, 1998 was entered by
without due process in that Judge Hanson found that
Respondents were not given sufficient notice. Judge
Hanson also found that the Utah Foreign Judgment Act
was the only way that a foreign judgment could be
enforced. Judge Hanson's findings have subsequently
been appealed and are before the Court of Appeals for
review. See R. at 348,
At the March 8, 1998 hearing, Judge Hanson stated that
the order did not preclude enforcement of subsequent
orders issued by the tribal court and he could not say
how his colleagues would rule on those orders. Judge
Hanson found that the October 16, 1998 and November 19,
1998 Orders needed to be filed under the Foreign
Judgment Act to obtain full faith and credit.
See

Exhibit

7.

B of Respondent's

Memorandum in Support

Motion

to Set Aside
(paragraph 9 of the findings of fact,
paragraph 7 of the Conclusions of Law, and paragraph 3
of the Order of the Court). See R. at 348.
In March of 1999, Petitioner commenced an action to
enforce the two orders before the Court. However, the
documents were lost in the filing process. See R. at
348.
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8.

9.

10.

11.

12.
13.

14.

When Petitioner discovered the glitch, counsel spoke
with the Court clerks who informed him that the action
needed to be filed again. See R. at 348.
On or about June 15, 1999, Petitioner commenced an
action for the enforcement of two foreign judgments
(dated respectively October 16, 1998 and November 19,
1998). The action was assigned to Judge Lewis by the
Court. See R. at 349.
On or about the 6th Day of July, 1999, Petitioner filed
a Memorandum in Support of Entry of the Judgments
(responding to a letter sent to the Court by
Respondent's counsel). See Exhibit #1. See R. at 349.
On or about the 9th day of August, 1999, Petitioner
filed an Application for Entry of Judgment and an Entry
of Judgment (the documents dealt solely with the
October 16, 1998 order).
See R. at 349.
The documents were served upon Counsel for the
Respondents by U.S. Mail.
See R. at 349.
On or about the 25th day of August, 1999, the trial
court entered an "Entry of Judgment" which notified all
that the October 16, 1998 order had been given full
faith and credit under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act.
See R. at 349.
On or about the 22nd day of November, 1999, Respondent
filed a Motion to Set Aside the Judgment and a Motion
to Stay.
See R. at 349.

a.

Rule 60(b)(3)

Appellees made the following legal assertions with respect
to the applicability of Rule 60(b)(3) to their Motion to Set
Aside:
...under subsection (3), this Court entered an Order by
no fault of its own despite being precluded from doing
so under the doctrine of res judicata because of
Petitioner's misrepresentations and misconduct. As
demonstrated in the factual allegations supporting the
motion, Petitioner had already brought an action before
Judge Hanson seeking to enforce the May 22, 1998 tribal
court order. Judge Hanson dismissed the action with
prejudice and found that the order was unenforceable
for lack of due process. Petitioner then filed a
second petition before this court seeking to have an
35

October 16, 1998 tribal court order enforced, which
order had in content and effect enforced the May 22,
1998 order that Judge Hanson found to be unenforceable.
This action was therefore commenced in bad faith and
the Court's entry of judgment was induced by
Petitioner's misrepresentation and misconduct. R. at
158.
In Response to these allegations of misrepresentation and
misconduct, Appellant offered the following:
Rule 60(b)(3) provides that a Court may set aside
a judgment if the Court determines that there was
"fraud..., misrepresentation, or other misconduct
of an adverse party." In support of their
contention, Respondents allege that Petitioner
allegedly failed to notify the Court of the action
before Judge Hanson and that the enforcement
action was allegedly "commenced in bad faith"
through Petitioner's alleged "misrepresentation
and misconduct."
Respondents grossly
misrepresent the facts to the Court.
First, Petitioner filed the action in
accordance with the Utah Foreign Judgment Act.
Petitioner provided all the facts which are
essential under the act at the time of filing.
Second, the Court stated to both parties' counsel
on the record at the November 23, 1999 hearing
that the Court had reviewed Judge Hanson's file
prior to ruling (showing that the Court had actual
notice of the Judge Hanson proceeding). Third,
Petitioner filed a Memorandum with the Court which
clearly delineated Judge Hanson's ruling and the
history of the case. See Exhibit #1. Petitioner
did not attempt to hide anything from the Court or
run from Judge Hanson's ruling. Fifth, Judge
Hanson notified the parties that he did not find
anything inappropriate in Petitioner's filing the
foreign judgment action on the October 16, 1998
and November 19, 1998 Orders after Respondent sent
a letter on June 21, 1999 raising these same
issues and asking for sanctions. See Exhibit #2
(Judge Hanson's Letter). At the March 8, 1999
hearing before Judge Hanson, he stated that he
expected that Petitioner would file the subsequent
orders under the Foreign Judgment Act and "one of
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his colleagues" would determine whether
enforcement was appropriate.
Sixth, the October 16, 1998 Order did not
merely enforce the May 22, 1998 Order that "Judge
Hanson found to be unenforceable." Rather, the
October 16, 1998 Order granted a Petition for Sole
Custody filed by Petitioner in Tribal Court and
served upon Respondents through their counsel.
The October 16, 1998 Order is a permanent order of
custody resulting from Petitioner's Petition for
Custody. The May 22, 1998 Order is an order of
temporary custody, resulting from an ex parte
motion for temporary custody from the Fort Peck
Tribes. While the October 16, 1998 Order does
reflect the procedural history of the case and
Respondents failure to obey the order of the
Court, the Order is based upon a default due to
Respondents's failure to respond and file an
answer to the Petition for Custody.
Seventh, Respondents sent a letter to this
Court notifying the Court of Respondents'
concerns. Petitioner filed an objection to that
letter. Respondents chose not to file any
pleadings as required by the Rules and the Foreign
Judgment Act to oppose entry of the judgment and
enforcement of said judgment. Eighth, Respondents
have failed to identify any specific conduct which
is not addressed herein which would substantiate
Respondents' claim of fraud.
Respondents allegations of fraud are without
merit. Petitioner has provided the Court with the
necessary information and the Court even took the
next step of reviewing the file from the matter
which was before Judge Hanson. Respondents merely
create allegations in a blatant attempt to sway
the Court. Respondents have failed to provide the
Court with any real evidence of fraud,
miscommunication, or misconduct as required by
Rule 60(b).
This Court determined from the record that there was no real
evidence of fraud, miscommunication, or misconduct as alleged by
Appellees in their Motion.

The trial court reviewed the record

before Judge Hanson (Case No. 980905344), had a July 15, 1999
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letter from Judge Hanson to counsel (See R. at 378-79),

and had

the July 26, 1999 Order of Dismissal from the matter decided by
Judge Hanson (Case No. 980905344) (See R. at 176-78).

The letter

from Judge Hanson states:
With regard to the complaints of Ms. Santana
that Mr. Shirley has brought this matter before
Judge Lewis, please be advised that I do not find
any impropriety in that regard, as it was my
intention to only address the May 22, 1998 Order
and the Writ of Assistance that was requested
based thereon.
If any subsequent Order has been properly
domesticated under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act
and is otherwise enforceable, I am confident that
Judge Lewis, who apparently is assigned to the
case, will handle the matter in accordance with
the facts as she finds them and in accordance with
the law. See R. at 379.
The July 26, 1999 Order of Dismissal provides the following:
9.
Petitioner also subsequently filed a Motion to
give Full Faith and Credit to two subsequent Tribal
Court Orders. See R. at 176.
7.
The subsequent Tribal Court Orders are not before
the Court under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act. See R.
at 177.
3.
The above-entitled action is dismissed without
prejudice as to any Order entered subsequent to the May
22, 1998 Order which has been entered by the Fort Peck
Tribal Court and the dismissal of this action in no way
precludes subsequent enforcement of subsequent Orders
through a filing under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act,
and which are otherwise enforceable under law. See R.
at 177 (Emphasis added).
Additionally, the Court was informed that Judge Hanson's
verbal ruling indicated this same point.
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This issue was

preserved by pleading (See R. at 54) in which Appellant made the
following proffer:
It should also be noted that in his verbal ruling,
Judge Hanson indicated that in order to have the
October and November judgments recognized, Petitioner
would have to file them in accordance with the Utah
Foreign Judgment Act. Judge Hanson also recognized
that it might go before one of the other judges....
These facts make it very clear that there was no fraud,
misrepresentation, or misconduct committed upon the Court or
Appellees in the manner alleged by Appellees.

The facts as

alleged by Appellees did not support the relief that Appellees
sought under Rule 60(b) (3).

Judge Hanson's letter and the Third

District Court Orders make it very clear that "Judge Hanson's"
ruling did not preclude enforcement of the Tribal Court Orders
which were entered subsequent to May 22, 1998.

Furthermore, the

record does not reveal that the trial court made any
determination which even closely resembles misconduct,
misrepresentation, or fraud upon the Court.
The pleadings filed by Appellant to commence the underlying
action demonstrate that they were filed appropriately in
accordance with the Foreign Judgment Action.

See R. at 1-18.

The application and the Notice of Entry of Judgment are equally
appropriate.

See R. at 66-75.

Appellees did not demonstrate an

adequate factual basis to support this alleged ground for relief.
This Court can determine from the record, which is all based upon
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a Motion and Response, that the factual assertions by Appellee
would have failed to adequately state a claim for any relief
under Rule 60(b)(3) as a matter of law to meet the burden of
proof.

Additionally, Judge Lewis did not find any misconduct or

fraud.
b.

Rule 60(b)(4)

Appellees' assertions as to Rule 60(b)(4) do not rise on
their face to the level to demonstrate that the Entry of Judgment
was void.

In order to be void the judgment must have been

rendered without jurisdiction.

Stanley Title Company v.

Continental Bank and Trust Company 485 P.2d 1400 (Utah 1971)
(Must show that the judgment on its face lacked subject matter
jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, lack of reasonable notice,
incompetency of the Court, or failure to comply with requirements
of due process).

Nothing in Appellees Motion gives rise to this

justification for a Rule 60(b) Motion because the Judgment was
void.

See R. at 151-207.
CONCLUSION
The Judgment of the District Court should be reversed

because the trial court erred in its conclusion regarding
enforcement and erred in granting the Rule 60(b) Motion to Set
Aside.

This Court should issue an order requiring that the

Foreign Judgments be given full faith and credit and directing
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the District Court to enter such orders as are necessary to
enforce said orders.
Dated this 6th Day of April, 2001

Jiiji C. Shirley
Counsel for Appellant

^

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this 6th

day of April, 2001, I

mailed, first class postage prepaid, true and correct copies of
the foregoing Appellant's Brief to:
Gary Beaudry
Attorney for Fort Peck Tribes
322 Main Street, Suite 102
Williston, N.D. 58802-2141

Maria Santana
Attorney for Appellants
44 West Broadway, Suite 304
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

/

;/ o

Jim/C. S M r k y ^
^
Attorney for Appellant
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Case No. 20000274-CA

v.
Boyd and Dorothy Searle,
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IN TEE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH

JAYNI SEARLE,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

COURT'S RULING

:

CASE NO.

996907234

:

BOYD SEARLE and DOROTHY SEARLE, :
Defendants.

:

A Notice to Submit has been filed, pursuant to Rule 4-501,
Code

of

Judicial

Administration,

in

connection

with

the

respondent's Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Rule 60 Motion,
Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Motion for Declaratory Judgment.
A hearing was held before the Court: on November 23, 1999,
Emergency Motion to Stay.

on the

At that time, the Court granted the

Motion to Stay temporarily, but deferred making a final ruling on
the Motion until counsel for the petitioner had an opportunity to
respond to the Motion and the Court had an opportunity to review
the case of In the Matter of Chad Searle. a Minor Indian Child.
Case No. 980905344, Judge Timorhy Hanson presiding. The petitioner
is now seeking a ruling on the Motion to Stay and the Motion to Set
Aside Judgment.

The petitioner has also filed a Notice of Request

for Delay of Decision with respect: to *che respondent's Motion for
Declaratory Judgment.

In her Notice, the petitioner requests that

noRiq
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the Court defer ruling on the Motion for Declaratory Judgment until
the Court has rendered a decision on the petitioner's pending
Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions.

Finally, the petitioner requests a

hearing on the Motion for Dpclaratory Judgment "if the Court is
inclined to grant the Motion."
The Court

determines that a hearing

on

the Motion

for

Declaratory Judgment and the Motion for Rule 11 Sanction, which
will shortly be ripe for decision, is appropriate to fiirther
clarify the parties1 positions.

The Court therefore schedules a

hearing on April 16, 2000, at 2:00 p.m. to consider these Motions.
Having reviewed the moving and responding memoranda with
respect to the remaining motions, the Court rules as stated herein.
Since the Motions

before the Court are

related

to

concerns

previously brought before Judge Hanson, this Court provides a brief
procedural history of that case and its connection to the present
case.

In Chad Searle, the petitioner herein filed a Writ of

Assistance seeking to enforce a May 22, 1993, Fort Peck Tribal
Court custody Order that transferred custody from respondent Boyd
Searle

to

the

petitioner.

The

Petition

recognition of the May 22nd Order as a

essentially

sought

foreign judgment under the

Utah Foreign Judgment Act. Judge Hanson denied the Petition on the
basis

that

since

respondent

Boyd

opportunity to be heard at the May 22nc

Searle

was

not

given

an

hearing, the Order was not
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entitled to full faith and credit. (See Order of Dismissal, dated
July 26, 1999) .
In this case, the petitioner is attempting to enforce the
Tribal Court's October 16, 1998, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Decree, finding that the respondents had

"wrongfully

maintained custody in contravention . . . of [the] Court's order of
May 22, 1998."

On August 25, 1999, this Court entered an Order

entitled "Ennry of Judgment" which purported to give full faith and
credit to the October 16th Decree. The respondents are now seeking
to set aside the August 25th Order and the October 16"*

Tribal

Court Decree.
The Court rules that the October 16"h Tribal Court Decree
directly relates to and s-ems from an Order which another court has
concluded

to

Specifically,

not
the

be

entitled

Decree

to

reinforces

full
the

reiterates that it "is hereby continued."

faith
May

and

22nd

credit.

Order

and

The October 16th Decree

is therefore flawed because it maintains custody of the minor child
under an Order which was issued without: giving respondent Boyd
Searle his due process rigirc to be heard. Accordingly, the October
16th Order is similarly not entitled to full faith and credit. The
Motion to Set Aside is therefore be granted in parr and this
Court's August 25cn Judgment is set: aside.
the Motion

seeks

However, to the extent

to set aside the Decree

itself, the Court
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determines that it has no jurisdiction to make such a ruling.

In

other words, respondents' Motion essentially urges this Court to
impermissibly act as an appellate court and review the propriety of
another court's ruling and then "overturn" that ruling by setting
it aside.

Accordingly, the Motion to Set Aside is granted with

respect to the August 25th "Judgment", but denied with respect to
the October 16th Tribal Court Decree.

As a corollary, since the

Court sets aside the August 25::i Judgment, the Motion seeking to
stay that Judgment is rendered moot.
Counsel for the respondents is to prepare an Order consistent
with this Court's Ruling and submit the same to the Court for
Review and sicrnature.
Dated this

(—"day of February, 2000.

_M
LESLIE A. LEWIS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

n n <-> -
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Appellee.
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ADDENDA B
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

i

MAG£D

JAYNISEARLE,
ORDER SETTING ASIDE JUDGMENT
Petitioner, .

vs.
BOYD SEARLE and
DOROTHY SEARLE,

Civil No. 99-690-7234 FJ
Judge: Leslie A. Lewis

Respondents.

The above-entitled matter came before the Court pursuant to Rule 4-501 Code of
Judicial Administration for decision on Respondents' Emergency Motion for Stay
Pending Rule 60 Motion, and Motion to Set Aside Judgment. The Court having reviewed
In the Matter of Chad Searle, a Minor Indian Child, Case No. 98-090-5344, Judge
Timothy Hanson presiding, having properly considered all the oral and written arguments
submitted to the Court by the parties, and being otherwise advised in the premises, the
Court hereby makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Petitioner Jayni Searle (hereafter "Petitioner") filed a petition for Writ of

Assistance in Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Case No. 98-

noR^o

090-5344, In the Matter of Chad Searle, A Minor Indian Child, seeking to enforce a May
22,1998, Fort Peck Tribal Court custody Order that transferred custody from Respondent
Boyd Searle (hereafter "Respondent") to the Petitioner. The petition sought recognition
of the May 22nd Order as a foreign judgment under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act.
2.

Judge Timothy R. Hanson denied the petition on the basis that since

Respondent was not given an opportunity to be heard at the May 22nd hearing, the Order
was not entitled to full faith and credit.
3.

Petitioner subsequently filed a petition before this Court to enforce an

October 16, 1998 Fort Peck Tribal Count Order's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Decree, finding that Respondents had "wrongfully maintained custody in
contravention.. .of [the] Court's order of May 22, 1998."
4.

On August 25, 1999, this Court entered an Order entitled "Entry of

Judgment" which purported to give full faith and credit to the October 16th Tribal Court
Decree.
5.

Respondents filed an Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Rule 60 Motion

to Set Aside Judgment, and a Motion to Set Aside Judgment. Respondents' motions
sought to stay the August 25th Order and to set aside the August 25th Order and the
October 16th Tribal Court Decree.
6.

A hearing was held before the Court on November 23, 1999, on the

Emergency Motion for Stay, at which time the Court granted the motion temporarily but
deferred making a final ruling on the Motion until counsel for Petitioner had an
opportunity to respond to the Motion and the Court had an opportunity to review the case
In the Matter of Chad Searle, a Minor Indian Child.

oo

7.

Petitioner subsequently filed a response in opposition to the motions and a

Notice to Submit for Decision pursuant to Rule 4-501, Code of Judicial Administration.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby enters its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The October 16th Tribal Court Decree directly relates to and stemsfroman

Order which another court in Chad Searle has concluded not to be entitled to full faith
and credit. Specifically, the Decree reinforces the May 22nd Order and reiterates that it
"is hereby continued." The October 16th Decree is therefore flawed because it maintains
custody of the minor child under an Order which was issued without giving Respondent
Boyd Searle his due process right to be heard. Accordingly, the October 16th Order is
similarly not entitled to full faith and credit, and the August 25th Order must be set aside.
2.

The Court has no jurisdiction to review the propriety of the Fort Peck

Tribal Court's ruling and then set aside or overturn that ruling as it pertains to the
October 16th Tribal Court Decree.
3.

Since the Court sets aside the August 25th Judgment, the Motion seeking

Stay of the Judgment is rendered moot.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court
hereby enters the following:
ORDER
1.

The August 25th Order is set aside and vacated, and shall not be enforced

by the parties or law enforcement.
DATED this _o!} day of

CS//T

, 2000.

O0R?2

.,011/s-ir^
BY THE COURT

pon6n
lonorable Leslie A.^Lewis
Third District Court Judge

Approved as to form

Jim C. Shirley

onR9Q

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 1$ day off-^^?

1999,1 caused to be served by mail

true and correct copy of the foregoing upon:
Jim Shirley
9 East Exchange Place, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Fax: 359-0181
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FORT PECK TRIBAL COURT
ASSINIBOINE AND SIOUX TRIBES
) FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
) OF LAW, AND DECREE
) Case No.
517

In the Matter of Chad Searle,
Minor Indian Child,
Jayni Searle,

)

) Judge
Plaintiff.

)

4^0^
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The above-entitled matter came before the Court on Jayni Searle's Petition for
Restoration of Custody. An entry of, notice of, and application for default having been entered
for Respondent's failure to answer the Petition in a timely manner. An Affidavit of Residence
and Grounds having been filed by Jayni Searle. The Court having reviewed the file and having
made its decision, now enters the following.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Chad Searle is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to a ruling by
Judge Stafne that this Court has exclusive jurisdiction.

2.

Chad Searle is a native American child and a member or eligible for membership
in the Fort Peck Assmibome and Sioux Tribes.

3r

Jayni Searle is a biological mother of Ctiad Searle.

4.

Temporary custody of Chad was awarded by the Court to Jayni Searle on May
22, 1998.

5.

The emotional father of Chad Searle died in February of 1998.

6.

Since then, Boyd and Dorothy Searle have wrongfully maintained custody in
contravention of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. 1901 et. seq.) and this
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Court's order of May 22, 1998.
7.

Boyd and Dorothy Searle are the emotional grandparents and currently have
physical custody despite the Court's oinder.

8.

Boyd and Dorothy Searle have petitioned the court to dismiss the termination
action pending in tribal court. See Attached exhibit # t .

9.

Jayni Searle is a person fit to assume custody on the afore-mentioned child.

10.

Jayni Searle and Chad Searle enjoy the relationship of mother and child.

11.

Jayni Searle and Chad Searle have a normal parent-child bond which has been
drastically impacted by the emotional grandparents.

BASED UPON the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby enters its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The matter is properly before the Court pursuant to tribal code.

2.

Jayni and Chad Searle are members or eligible for membership in the Fort Peck
Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes.

3.

Jayni Searle is domiciled on the reservation.

4.

Chad Searle, pursuant to law and tribal custom, became domiciled on the
reservation due to the death of his physical custodian and emotional father, Boyd
Carl Searle.

5.

Jayni Searle is a fit and appropriate person who should be awarded custody

BASED UPON the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court hereby
enters the following:
DECREE AND ORDER
1.

Chad Searle is hereby placed in the permanent custody, care, and control of
Jayni Searle, his natural and biological mother.

2.

The previous order requiring transfer of Chad Searle to the reservation is hereby
continued.

3.

Law enforcement is hereby directed to remove the child and retum him to the
reservation.

SIGNED THIS

[(r navX>rrtoP

1998.

JUDGE
TRIBAL COURT JUDGI

j^rrr-gertificate
of Mailing
.day ofv v J
,1998 I deposited in the United States Mail,
On this (In
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Entry of Default to: Maria
Santana, 2159 South 700 East, Suite 100, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
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A Minor Indian Child,

)

CAUSE

Jayni Searle,

)

Case No.

Plaintiff.

)

ORDER RE: ORDER TO SHOW

;Z^ 1 T

Judge f ^ T A ^ K l FT

)

The above-entitled matter came before the Court for hearing on an Order to
Show Cause on the 19tk Day of November, 1998. Present for the hearing was Jayni
Searle. The Court notes that Boyd and Dorothy Searle were personally served with
notice of the hearing and the Order to Show Cause by certified, return receipt, U.S.
mail. The Court notes futher that counsel for Boyd and Dorothy Searle, Maria Christina
Santana, was served by certified, return receipt U.S. mail. The Court, having heard
testimony from Jayni Searle and argument and having fully reviewed the file, enters the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Chad Searle is an Indian child as defined in the Indian Child Welfare Act.

2.

Jayni Searle is an Indian parent as defined in the Indian Child Welfare Act

3.

Jayni Searle is domiciled on the reservation.

4.

Boyd Carl Searle was Chad Searle's emotional father, having been
deemed so by his own admission in a divorce action in the Third District
Court.

5.

On February 1998, Boyd Carl Searle died.

6.

Chad Searle was in the custody of his emotional father, Boyd Carl Searle,
when the emotional father died.

7.

t|

-

,_,
-A

Deputy GterfrClL

In the Matter of Chad Searle,

;

The emotional grandparents, Boyd and Dorothy Searle filed a Petition to
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Terminate Parental Rights of Jayni Searle in the Third District Court in
Salt Lake County for the State of Utah.
8.

On March 3rJ, 1998, Boyd and Dorothy Searle obtained temporary
custody of Chad through order of the Third District Juvenile Court of
Utah

9.

Boyd and Dorothy Searle also filed a Petition for Protective Order

10.

Subsequent to that order, Jayni Searle retained private counsel, Mr Jim
C. Shirley of Salt Lake City, Utah.

11.

Mr. Shirley obtained a copy of the March 3rd, 1998 order He
subsequently received copies of the other documents This transpired
after the order of temporary custody was entered by the juvenile court
Boyd and Dorothy Searle did not serve Jayni Searle or the Fort Peck
Tribes with Notice prior to obtaining the temporary custody order in
juvenile court or the protective order in district court

12

The Petition for Protective Order was certified from Utah's Third District
Court to Utah's Third District Juvenile Court

13.

Mr Shirley sent courtesy copies of the pleadings to Mr Gary Beaudry,
counsel for the Fort Peck Tribes Prior to receipt of these courtesy copies,
the tribe had not been notified of the proceedings as required by I C W A

14

Ms Searle filed a Petition to transfer the proceedings to tribal court under
25 U S C 1911 (b) in the juvenile court, alleging concurrent jurisdiction

15

Ms Searle subsequently filed an Amended Petition to transfer under 25
U S C 1911 (a) in the juvenile court, alleging exclusive jurisdiction

16.

Ms Searle filed a Petition to invalidate the improperly entered custody
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order, citing to 25 U.S.C. 1914 and alleging violauuns of 1912(a,d,&e).
17.

Boyd and Dorothy Searle filed a Response to the Amended Petition to
Transfer, alleging that domicile had not changed at the death of the
emotional father and that Jayni Searle abandoned the child, Chad
Searle.

18.

Ms. Searle filed a Reply which cited to case law which demonstrated
that under common law domicile did change at the death of a custodian
to the surviving natural parent and which alleged grounds to demonstrate
that Ms. Searle had not abandoned the child.

19.

On May 15tk, 1998, the Third District Juvenile Court, in and for the state
of Utah issued an order transferring jurisdiction to the tribal court.

20.

On May 22n<L 1998, this Court found that it has exclusive jurisdiction and
accepted jurisdiction. Additionally, the Court invalidated the previous
order granting custody to Boyd and Dorothy Searle and ordered that the
child be brought back to the reservation and placed in the temporary
custody of the natural mother.

21.

On the 3rd Day of June, 1998, the Third District Juvenile Court entered
an order staying its May 15tk, 1998 order.

22.

On June 8th, 1998, the tribal and juvenile courts issues stays of the
proceedings pending hearing before an appeals or federal court on the
issue of whether the juvenile court had any jurisdiction to enter such
an order.

23.

Ms. Searle caused to be filed an appeal in the Court of Appeals in and
for Utah.

24.

On August 31st, 1998, counsel for Boyd and Dorothy Searle signed a
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voluntary dismissal of the Petition to Terminate.
25.

On the 1 st Day of September, 1998, the Court of Appeals found that the
Juvenile Court did not have jurisdiction to enter any orders.

26.

On the 8th Day of September, 1998, Jayni Searle filed a Petition for Sole
Custody.

27.

Counsel for Boyd and Dorothy Searle, Maria Santana, was served with
this Petition for Sole Custody.

28.

On the 9tk Day of September, 1998, Jayni Searle filed a Stipulation to
Dismiss Action Brought by Boyd and Dorothy Searle.

29.

On the 9th Day of September, 1998, the Court granted Boyd and Dorothy
Searle's voluntary dismissal but specifically ordered that "the previous
order of temporary custody entered by this Court on May 22nd, 1998, is
hereby continued with Jayni Searle."

30.

Counsel for Boyd and Dorothy Searle were served with the stipulation and
the order.

31.

Jayni Searle subsequently filed an Notice of Entry of Default, Entry of
Default, and Application for Entry of Default. All these documents were
served on counsel for Boyd and Dorothy Searle, Maria Christina Santana,
by U.S. Mail.

32.

The Court entered a default and entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Decree. The decree was served on counsel for Boyd and
Dorothy Searle, Maria Christina Santana, by U.S. Mail.

33.

Jayni Searle subsequently filed a Corrected Notice of Entry of Default.
Corrected Entry of Default, and Corrected Application for Entry of Default
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All these documents were served on counsel for uoyd and Dorothy
Searle, Maria Christina Santana, by U.S. mail.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby enters its:
Conclusions of Law

1.

Chad Searle is an Indian Child as defined by the Indian Child Welfare Act.

2.

The Court previously entered a finding and conclusion of exclusive
jurisdiction under 25 U.S.C. 1911(a) based upon the fact that upon the
death of the custodian/emotional father, domicile of Chad Searle became
that of his mother pursuant to tribal custom and well-established common
law. The Court previously rejected Boyd and Dorothy Searle's contentions as mefitiess.

3.

The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the issues of custody and
contempt before it. The Indian Child Welfare Act applies to the case at
hand. Tribal court is the proper forum for any litigation involving the
custody of an Indian child which is not the result of a divorce action or
delinquency matter. The Court obtained jurisdiction originally due to the
transfer of the litigation involving the Petition to Terminate Parental Rights.
At the time the Petition to Terminate Parental Right was withdrawn, the
Court retained jurisdiction due to a pending Petition for Sole Custody filed
by Jayni Searle which was filed prior to the stipulation allowing dismissal.
The Court continues to enjoy exclusive jurisdiction. The Court has
original jurisdiction over the custody matter involving Chad Searle due to
the filing of the Petition for Sole Custody. Jurisdiction has never been
terminated by the Court as contended by the emotional grandparents,

nnnnf}

Boyd and Durothy Searle.
4.

The Court has personal jurisdiction over Jayni Searle and Chad Searle as
domiciliaries of the reservation pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act.

5.

The court has personal jurisdiction over Boyd and Dorothy Searle that was
acquired when litigation involving the termination of parental right action
was transferred to Tribal Court. See 92 Corpus Juris Secundum, Venue
SS 207 (the court receiving the transfer of jurisdiction/venue "thereby
acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter, all the parties
thereto, and all matters incident thereto, and it may inquire into
matters connected with the subject matter of the action").

6.

Additionally, the Court has jurisdiction due to emotional grandparents
voluntary filing of pleadings before the Court. The Rules of Tribal Procedure require that the party file a special and limited appearance if they
do not wish to subject themselves to the jurisdiction of the tribal court
Boyd and Dorothy Searle failed to file any special and limited appearance
as required.

7.

Jayni Searle having satisfied her burden by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that:
a.

Boyd arrcTDorothy Searle were served with a true and correct
copy of the Order to Show Cause,

b.

Boyd and Dorothy Searle voluntarily and willfully failed to comply
with the Court's order to appear and produce the child;

c.

Boyd and Dorothy Searle voluntarily and willfully failed to comply
with the Court's May 22nd, 1998 order to surrender physical
custody of the child, and
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d.

that Boyd and Dorothy Searle had the capacity to comply with the
Court's orders.

BASED upon the foregoing Conclusions of Law, the Court hereby enters the
following:

ORDER
1.

Boyd and Dorothy Searle are hereby held in contempt of Court;

2.

The Court will stay the jail time if and when Boyd and Dorothy Searle
agree to bring Chad to the reservation as previously ordered;

3.

A bench warrant is issued for the immediate detention and transport
of Boyd and Dorothy Searle to jail;

4.

The Court will lift the Bench Warrant if and when Boyd and Dorothy
Searle contact the court, agree to return the child to the reservation,
and make suitable arrangements for the transport of Chad^Searle to
the reservation;

5.

A bench warrant is issued for the immediate detention and transport
of Chad Searle to the reservation;

6.

The court will lift the Bench Warrant upon Chad Searle's return to the
custody of his mother;

7.

Boyd and Dorothy Searle be required to reimburse the tribe for costs
incurred in the Fort Peck Tribe's effort to secure the release and return
of Chad Searle to the reservation;

8.

The Fort Peck Tribes are ordered to provide the Court with a specific
amount;

9.

Boyd and Dorothy Searle are ordered to pay Jayni Searle for

oooii

reasonable attorneys fees incurred; and
10.

Jayni Searle is instructed to secure a list of attorneys fees
incurred.

^ D A Y O F i t f ^ V ^ l , 1998.

DATED THIS A ^ ^ D A Y OF
FORT PECK TRIBAL COURT

JUDGE
.
• Certificate of Mailing
On this Q ^ T
day of {vQ\J
, 1998 I deposited in the United States Mail,
postage prepaid, a true and correct signed copy of the foregoing Order Re:

Order to Show Cause to:
Maria Christina Santana
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
BOYD AND DOROTHY SEARLE
4906 South 4460 West
Kearns, Utah 84118
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
Jayni Searle,
Appellant,
I

Case No. 20000274-CA

]
1

Priority 4

v.
Boyd and Dorothy Searle,
Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE THIRD DISTRICT
COURT, HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS PRESIDING
•oOo-

ADDENDA E

IN TEE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF CHAD SEARLE,
A MINOR INDIAN CHILD

ORDER OF DISMISSAL
CASE NO. 980905344

JAYNI SEARLE/
Petitioner,
vs.
BOYD SEARLE,
SALT LAK5 CCJNVY

Respondent.

By.
ucpury Car*

The above-entitled matter came before the Court on March 8,
1999 for hearing on p e t i t i o n e r ' s Petition for Writ of Assistance.
Jim C. Shirley appeared representing p e t i t i o n e r ,
Maria Cristina Santana appeared representing
Searle.

Boyd Searle personally appeared.

Jayni Searle.

respondent,

Boyd

The p a r t i e s have filed

extensive pleadings regarding the issues before the Court,

the

parties made their respective arguments. The Court having reviewed
the f i l e ,

having properly considered a l l the o r a l and written

arguments submitted to the Court by the p a r t i e s , the Court hereby
makes the following:
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SEARLE V. SEARLE

PAGE TWO

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

In February of 1998, respondent

filed in the Third

District Juvenile Court a Petition to Terminate the Parental Rights
of Jayni Searle in relation to Chad Searle.
2.

Subsequently, respondent filed an Ex Parte Motion for

Custody and obtained an Ex Parte Order of Temporary Custody on
March 3, 1998.
3.

Petitioner filed a Petition to Transfer to Tribal Court

in March of 1998.
4.

The

Third

Johansson, presiding,

District

Juvenile

Court,

transferred jurisdiction

Judge
over

Olof

A.

a pending

Petition for Termination to the Fort Peck Tribal Court.
5.

The Fort Peck Tribal Court accepted jurisdiction and

transferred custody of the minor child on May 22, 1998.
6.

Boyd Searle was not provided notice that the Fort Peck

Tribal Court would issue an Order on the issue of custody.
7.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Assistance with

this Court seeking assistance of this Court in enforcing the May
22, 1998 Fort Peck Tribal Court custody Order.
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SEARLE V. SEARLE

8.

PAGE THREE

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

The parties have subsequently filed numerous pleadings

regarding

the

appropriateness

of the issuance

of

a Writ of

Assistance.
9.

Petitioner also subsequently filed a Motion to give Full

Faith and Credit to two subsequent Tribal Court Orders.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby
enters its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The May 22, 1998 Order of the Fort Peck Tribal Court

transferring custody from respondent to petitioner is a foreign
j udgment.
2.

As a foreign judgment, the judgment must be filed in

accordance with the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, Utah Code Ann.,
Section 78-22a-l, et seq.
3.

The Petition for Writ of Assistance does not comply with

the Utah Foreign Judgment Act.
4.

Petitioner was entitled to be heard at a hearing prior to

the transfer of custody by the Fort Peck Tribal Court.
5.

The failure to give respondent an opportunity to be heard

at a hearing prior to transfer of custody constitutes a violation
of respondent's due process rights.
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SEARLE V. SEARLE

6.

PAGE FOUR

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

As such, the May 22, 1998 Order transferring custody is

not entitled to full faith and credit.
7.

The subsequent Tribal Court Orders are not before the

Court under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, the Court hereby enters the following:
ORDER
1.

The Petition for Writ of Assistance is denied.

2.

The action is dismissed with prejudice as to the Fort

Peck Tribal Court May 22, 1998 Order.
3.

The above-entitled action is dismissed without prejudice

as to any Order entered subsequent to the May 22, 1998 Order which
has been entered by the Fort Peck Tribal Court and the dismissal of
this

action

in

no

way

precludes

subsequent

enforcement

of

subsequent Orders through a filing under the Utah Foreign Judgment
Act, and which are otherwise enforceable under law.
Dated this

.day of July, 1999.

/<s?

_

TIMOTHY R. HANSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
Jayni Searle,

]

Appellant,
Case No. 20000274-CA
v.
Boyd and Dorothy Searle,
Appellee.

]
]
Priority 4

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE THIRD DISTRICT
COURT, HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS PRESIDING
-0O0-

ADDENDA F

Wfc & Iubtctal ©fetrtrt Ct.rt
Scott M. Matheson Courthouse
450 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
801-238-7515

Timothy R. Hanson
District Judge

July 15, 1999
vJim C. Shirley, Esq,
9 Exchange Place, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Maria Cristina Santana, Esq.
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Re:

Jayni Searle v. Boyd Searle
Case No. 980905344

Dear Counsel:
I have the request for decision in the above-referenced matter
relating to the proper form of Order as a result of the hearing on
March 8, 1999.
I had anticipated a transcript prepared by one of the court
reporters here at the District Court, and note that the transcript
was prepared by personnel of Mr. Shirley's office by reviewing a
videotape.
I have no concerns that the transcript is not
reasonably accurate, but it should be clear that it is not an
official transcript.
I have examined both the Orders submitted and am satisfied
that Mr. Shirleyfs Order, with some modifications, is appropriate,
and rather than ask Mr. Shirley to make those modifications, I have
prepared an Order, a copy of which is enclosed, making the changes
that I require.
I was satisfied that the Findings of Fact in Mr. Shirley's
proposed Order were appropriate, as well as the Conclusions of Law.
The Order of Dismissal, however, was not complete and as you will
note, includes now as paragraph 1, the statement that the Petition
for Writ of Assistance is denied; paragraph 1, which is now
numbered paragraph 2 is slightly modified to strike the words "the
above-entitled", and insert the word "this"; and finally, on what
was previously proposed paragraph 2 in the Order is now paragraph
3 and contains after the words "Utah Foreign Judgment Act", the
following: "and which are otherwise enforceable under law".
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Jim C. Shirley, Esq.
Maria Cristina Santana, Esq.

-2-

July 15, 1999

With those modifications, the Order is appropriate and I have
signed the same, all on a date shown on your copy.
With regard to the complaints of Ms. Santana that Mr. Shirley
has brought this matter before Judge Lewis, please be advised that
I do not find any impropriety in that regard, as it was my
intention to only address the May 22, 1998 Order and the Writ of
Assistance that was requested based thereon.
If any subsequent Order has been properly domesticated under
the Utah Foreign Judgment Act and is otherwise enforceable, I am
confident that Judge Lewis, who apparently is assigned to the case,
will handle the matter in accordance with the facts as she finds
them and in accordance with the law.
Accordingly, the informal request/for sanctions as contained
in Ms. Santana1s letter of June 21,yl999 is refused. Hopefully,
this Order that I have signed wil/ bring this case number to a
conclusion.

Timothy R. Hanson
District Court Judge
TRHrjsh
Enclosure
cc: Gary Beaudry, Esq.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
Jayni Searle,
Appellant,
)

Case No. 20000274-CA

'
I

Priority 4

v.
Boyd and Dorothy Searle,
Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE THIRD DISTRICT
COURT, HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS PRESIDING
-0O0-

ADDENDA G

JIM C. SHIRLEY (#7100)
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
9 EXCHANGE PLACE, SUITE 400
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111

?

TELEPHONE: (801) 359-8003
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
JAYNI SEARLE,
Petitioner,

} APPLICATION FOR ENTRY OF
} JUDGMENT
}

VS.

} CASE NO. 996907234FJ

BOYD AND DOROTHY SEARLE.

}

Respondent.

} JUDGE LESLI T.EWIS

In accordance with U.C.A. § 78-22a-l et. seq. (1998 as amended), the Utah Foreign
Judgment Act, Jayni Searle, by and through counsel of record, hereby applies to this Court for entry
of judgment based upon the following matters appearing of record:
1.

A Notice of Judgment was filed on the 15* Day of June, 1999 in accordance with the
Utah Foreign Judgment Act, U.C.A. § 78-22a-2(2);

2.

An Affidavit was filed on the 15th Day of June, 1999 in accordance with the Utah
Foreign Judgment Act, U.C.A. § 78-22a-3(l);

3.

Thirty days have passed as required by the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, U.C.A. § 7822a-3(3), prior to any process regarding the enforcement of the foreign judgment;

4.

Boyd and Dorothy Searle have failed tofilea request for Stay as required by the Utah
Foreign Judgment Act, U.C.A. § 78-22a-4;

5.

Respondents have failed to raise any issue as to the October 16, 1998 order.
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6.

The order should now be given full faith and credit and "should be treated in all
respects as a judgment of a district court of Utah" as set forth in the Utah Foreign
Judgment Act, U.C.A. § 78-22a-l(l &2); and

7.

An Entry of Judgment for each order was filed with this Application.

Therefore, Petitioner hereby requests that the Court enter the foreign judgments for
enforcement in Utah by issuing the two Entry of Judgment pleadings filed herewith.
Dated This

f'

Day of _
huc^j^C

, 1999.

Jim d. Shirley ^
M
Attorney for Jayni Searle
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
On this

//?

day mlX10\US\

19991 mailed, postage pre-paid First Class, a

copy of the foregoing Application for Entry of Judgment to:
Maria Christina Santana
Santana Law Firm
Attorney for Petitioner
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
ri440Jut=i
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
Jayni Searle,
Appellant,
I

Case No. 20000274-CA

v.
Boyd and Dorothy Searle,
Appellee.
Priority 4

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE THIRD DISTRICT
COURT, HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS PRESIDING
-0O0-

ADDENDA H

JIM C. SHIRLEY (#7100)
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
9 EXCHANGE PLACE, SUITE 400
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
TELEPHONE: (801) 359-8003
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
JAYNI SEARLE,

ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

Petitioner,
vs.

CASE NO. 99S9Q7234FJ

BOYD AND DOROTHY SEARLE.
Respondent.

JUDGE LESLI LEWIS

A Notice of Judgment was filed by Jayni Searle on the 15
of June, 1999 in the above-entitled court.

Day

The Judgment was

entered by the Fort Peck Assiniboine and Sioux Tribal Court on the
16th Day of October, 1998.

A review of the record indicates that

the Notice of Judgment was served by Certified Mail by the Clerk of
the Court on Boyd and Dorothy Searle at 4906 South 4460 West,
Kearns, Utah 84118. Certified copies of the foreign judgments were
filed with the Court.

All appropriate documentation was filed as

required by the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, Utah Code Anno. § 7822a-l et. seg.

one 63

Respondents, Boyd and Dorothy Searle, filed a responsive
pleading but failed to raise any issues which would prevent the
entry of the October 16, 1998 order, all comments were directed at
the November 23, 1998 order of contempt.

Additionally, Boyd and

Dorothy Searle have failed to file a request for Stay as required
by the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, U.C.A. § 78-22a-4.

The thirty

day time period having lapsed and Respondents having failed to file
a request for Stay as required by the Utah Foreign Judgment Act,
the Court hereby recognizes and gives full faith and credit to the
October 16, 1998 order of the Fort Peck Tribal Court attached
hereto.

The attached order is hereby given full faith and credit,

subject

to all

judgments.

the enforcement

provisions

which govern such

All county, local, and other peace officers and/or law

enforcement personnel are hereby directed to give full faith and
credit to the attached judgments.
DATED THIS

/""-?

-eiiERK OF THE COURT

:_, 1999.

DEPUTY CLERK OF THE COURT

<6
•^ii'f-r.:.

>\

OOPBH

CERTIFICATE OF MAFT JNG

On this &

•umd.

day ofiXUlhUfZA

19991 mailed, postage pre-paid First Class, a

copy of the foregoing Unsigned Entry of Judgment to:
Maria Christina Santana
Santana Law Firm
Attorney for Petitioner
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

C7f

WJ^

00070

JIM C. SHIRLEY (#7100)
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
9 EXCHANGE PLACE, SUITE 400
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
TELEPHONE: (801) 359-8003
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
JAYNI SEARLE,

ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

Petitioner,
CASE NO. 996907234FJ

vs.
BOYD AND DOROTHY SEARLE.
Respondent.

JUDGE LESLI LEWIS

Exhibit #1
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JAYNI SEARLE
PROSE
P.O. BOX 702
WOLF POINT, MONTANA 59201
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FORT PECK TRIBAL COURT
ASSINIBOINE AND SIOUX TRIBES
In the Matter of Chad Searle,
Minor Indian Child,

) FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
) OF LAW, AND DECREE
) Case No.
517

Jayni Searle,

) Judge ^
Plaintiff.

\)J\ JfoMG

)

V V — — -

The above-entitled matter came before the Court on Jayni Searie's Petition for
Restoration of Custody. An entry of, notice of, and application for default having been entered
for Respondent's failure to answer the Petition in a timely manner. An Affidavit of Residence
and Grounds having been filed by Jayni Searte. The Court having reviewed the file and having
made its decision, now enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Chad Searle is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to a ruling by
Judge Stafne that this Court has exclusive jurisdiction.

2.

Chad Searle is a native American child and a member or eligible for membership
in the Fort Peck Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes.

3.

Jayni Searle is a biological mother of Chad Searle.

4.

Temporary custody of Chad was awarded by the Court to Jayni Searle on May
22, 1998.

5.

The emotional father of Chad Searle died in February of 1998.

6.

Since then, Boyd and Dorothy Searle have wrongfully maintained custody in
contravention of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. 1901 et. seq.) and this

00

Court's order of May 22, 1998.
7.

Boyd and Dorothy Searle are the emotional grandparents and currently have
physical custody despite the Court's order.

8.

Boyd and Dorothy Searle have petitioned the court to dismiss the termination
action pending in tribal court. See Attached exhibit #1.

9.

Jayni Searle is a person fit to assume custody on the afore-mentioned child.

10.

Jayni Searle and Chad Searle enjoy the relationship of mother and child.

11.

Jayni Searle and Chad Searle have a normal parent-child bond which has been
drastically impacted by the emotional grandparents.

BASED UPON the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby enters its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The matter is properly before the Court pursuant to tribal code.

2.

Jayni and Chad Searle are members or eligible for membership in the Fort Peck
Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes.

3.

Jayni Searle is domiciled on the reservation.

4.

Chad Searle, pursuant to law and tribal custom, became domiciled on the
reservation due to the death of his physical custodian and emotional father, Boyd
Carl Searle.

5.

Jayni Searle is a fit and appropriate person who should be awarded custody

BASED UPON the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court hereby
enters the following:
DECREE AND ORDER
1.

Chad Searle is hereby placed in the permanent custody, care, and control of
Jayni Searle, his natural and biological mother.

2.

The previous order requiring transfer of Chad Searle to the reservation is hereby
continued.

3.

Law enforcement is hereby directed to remove the child and return him to the
reservation.

SIGNED THIS [ l

r

Dav ofV T H H L H P - i c

.

. 1998.

JUDGE
TRIBAL COURT JUDG

, i
,^~—Certificate of Mailing
On this I (o
dav ofV V J
,1998 I deposited in the United States Mail,
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Entry of Default to: Maria
Santana, 2159 South 700 East, Suite 100, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
Jayni Searle,
Appellant,
1

Case No. 20000274-CA

)

Priority 4

v.
Boyd and Dorothy Searle,
Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE THIRD DISTRICT
COURT, HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS PRESIDING
-0O0-

ADDENDA I

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

JIM C. SHIRLEY (#7100)
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
9 EXCHANGE PLACE, SUITE 400
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
TELEPHONE: (801) 359-8003

JUN 1 51999
SALT L>KE COUNTY
x

Deputy Cfekk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
JAYNI SEARLE,

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

vs.

CASE NO

BOYD AND DOROTHY SEARLE.

Judge

*?*?^a*T3g>^
LCcOl

FT

S

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT JUDGMENTS DATED OCTOBER 16, 1998 AND
NOVEMBER 23, 1998 FILED IN THE FORT PECK ASSINIBOINE AND SIOUX
TRIBAL COURT HAS BEEN FILED IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH UNDER' THE PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH FOREIGN JUDGMENT
ACT (UCA 78-22a-1) . THIS JUDGMENT HAS THE SAME LEGAL FORCE AND
EFFECT AS A JUDGMENT RENDERED BY A UTAH STATE COURT.

x^e

H.

mq

DATE
NAME & P.O./ADDRESS OF JUDGMENT CREDITOR:
JAYNI SEARLE
P.O. BOX 702
WOLF POINT, MONTANA 59201
NAME & P.O./ADDRESS OF CREDITOR'S ATTORNEY:
JIM C. SHIRLEY
LAHERTY AND ASSOCIATES, P.C.
9 EXCHANGE PLACE, SUITE 4 00
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
CERTIFICATE QF MAILING
STATE OF UTAH

)

County of Salt Lake

)

ss
SUSArJ

L. SurJO&gfZG

(COURT CLERK) , BEING FIRST DULY SWORN,

UPON OATH STATES THAT HE/SHE HAS MAILED A COPY OF THE NOTICE OF

0001

JUDGMENT WITH THE ATTACHED ORDERS TO THE JUDGMENT DEBTORS, BOYD AND
DOROTHY SEARLE, AT 4906 SOUTH 4460 WEST, KEARNS, UTAH 84118.
THIS

Ig

DAY OF Q ^ H j e .

1999.

DEPUTY CLERK
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
Jayni Searle,

]

Appellant,
)
v .

Case No. 20000274-CA

•"

Boyd and Dorothy Searle,
Appellee.
Priority 4
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE THIRD DISTRICT
COURT, HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS PRESIDING
-oOo-

ADDENDA J

JIM C. SHIRLEY (#7100)
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
9 EXCHANGE PLACE, SUITE 400
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
TELEPHONE: (801) 359-8003

co;::n:;

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
JAYNI SEARLE,

•

NOTICE OF APPEAL

•

CASE NO. 99S907234FJ

•

JUDGE T.EST.T T.KWTS

Petitioner,
vs.
BOYD AND DOROTHY SEARLE.
Respondents.

Comes now Petitioner, Jayni Searle, by and through counsel, Jim C. Shirley of Laherty &
Associates, P.C, and hereby enters this Notice of Appeal. Petitioner appeals to the Utah Court of
Appeals the February 25, 2000, Order Setting Aside Judgment issued by the Third District Court,
Judge Leslie A. Lewis presiding. Attached hereto as Exhibit #1.
DATED THIS _ 2 _ day of

l/^rcU

f

2000.

JIMaSHIRf^y
Attorney for Jayni Searle
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
On this

/ 7

day of //[fircll^

a copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal to:
Maria Christina Santana
Santana Law Firm
Attorney for Petitioner
2t5gLSorth 700 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106-

Que r csi/ct c( A^ u r

9c//oI

, 2000,1 mailed, postage pre-paid First Class,

-EXHIBIT #7-

00628

Maria Cristina Santana (7300)
SANTANA LAW FIRM
44 West Broadway, Suite 304
Salt Lake Citv.
City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 363-5803

FILED DISTRICT COURT
TWrd
Judicial District
,
FEB O dWI

-

BV

•winy
i i i C I Y vi

i/»

•puty Clark
Deputy

Attorney for Respondents
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JAYNISEARLE,
ORDER SETTING ASIDE JUDGMENT
Petitioner,

vs.
BOYD SEARLE and
DOROTHY SEARLE,

Civil No. 99-690-7234 FJ
Judge: Leslie A. Lewis

Respondents.

The above-entitled matter came before the Court pursuant to Rule 4-501 Code of
Judicial Administration for decision on Respondents' Emergency Motion for Stay
Pending Rule 60 Motion, and Motion to Set Aside Judgment The Court having reviewed
In the Matter of Chad Searle. a Minor Indian Child Case No. 98-090-5344, Judge
Timothy Hanson presiding, having properly considered all the oral and written arguments
submitted to the Court by the parties, and being otherwise advised in the premises, the
Court hereby makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Petitioner Jayni Searle (hereafter "Petitioner") filed a petition for Writ of

Assistance in Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Case No. 98-

090-5344, In the Matter of Chad Searle. A Minor Indian Child seeking to enforce a May
22,1998, Fort Peck Tribal Court custody Order that transferred custody from Respondent
Boyd Searle (hereafter "Respondent") to the Petitioner. The petition sought recognition
of the May 22nd Order as a foreign judgment under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act.
2.

Judge Timothy R. Hanson denied the petition on the basis that since

Respondent was not given an opportunity to be heard at the May 22nd hearing, the Order
was not entitled to full faith and credit
3.

Petitioner subsequently filed a petition before this Court to enforce an

October 16, 1998 Fort Peck Tribal Court Order's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Decree, finding that Respondents had ''wrongfully maintained custody in
contravention...of [the] Court's order of May 22,1998."
4.

On August 25, 1999, this Court entered an Order entitled "Entry of

Judgment" which purported to give full faith and credit to the October 16th Tribal Court
Decree.
5.

Respondents filed an Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Rule 60 Motion

to Set Aside Judgment, and a Motion to Set Aside Judgment. Respondents' motions
sought to stay the August 25th Order and to set aside the August 25th Order and the
October 16th Tribal Court Decree.
6.

A hearing" was held before the Court on November 23, 1999, on the

Emergency Motion for Stay, at which time the Court granted the motion temporarily but
deferred making a final ruling on the Motion until counsel for Petitioner had an
opportunity to respond to the Motion and the Court had an opportunity to review the case
In the Matter of Chad Searle. a Minor Indian Child.

7.

Petitioner subsequently filed a response in opposition to the motions and a

Notice to Submit for Decision pursuant to Rule 4-501, Code of Judicial Administration.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby enters its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The October 16th Tribal Court Decree directly relates to and stems from an

Order which another court in Chad Searle has concluded not to be entitled to full faith
and credit Specifically, the Decree reinforces the May 22nd Order and reiterates that it
"is hereby continued." The October 16th Decree is therefore flawed because it maintains
custody of the minor child under an Order which was issued without giving Respondent
Boyd Searle his due process right to be heard. Accordingly, the October 16th Order is
similarly not entitled to full faith and credit, and the August 25th Order must be set aside.
2.

The Court has no jurisdiction to review the propriety of the Fort Peck

Tribal Court's ruling and then set aside or overturn that ruling as it pertains to the
October 16th Tribal Court Decree.
3.

Since the Court sets aside the August 25th Judgment, the Motion seeking

Stay of the Judgment is rendered moot
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court
hereby enters the following:
ORDER
1.

The August 25th Order is set aside and vacated, and shall not be enforced

by the parties or law enforcement.
DATED this _ ^ d a y of _ £ > ^ L _ , 2000.

Oj^^t)
BY THE COURT

lonOTable Leslie ASLewis
i District Court Judge

Approved as to form

Jim C. Shirley

,1^

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this fl/ day o i p ^ ^ 1999,1 caused to be served by mail
true and correct copy of the foregoing upon:
Jim Shirley
9 East Exchange Place, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Fax: 359-0181

